• Source: Protection racket

A protection racket is a type of racket and a scheme of organized crime perpetrated by a potentially hazardous organized crime group that generally guarantees protection outside the sanction of the law to another entity or individual from violence, robbery, ransacking, arson, vandalism, and other such threats, in exchange for payments at regular intervals. Each payment is called "protection money" or a "protection fee". An organized crime group determines an affordable or reasonable fee by negotiating with each of its payers, to ensure that each payer can pay the fee on a regular basis and on time. Protections rackets can vary in terms of their levels of sophistication or organization; it is not uncommon for their operations to emulate the structures or methods used by tax authorities within legitimate governments to collect taxes from taxpayers.
The perpetrators of a protection racket may protect vulnerable targets from other dangerous individuals and groups or may simply offer to refrain from themselves carrying out attacks on the targets, and usually both of these forms of protection are implied in the racket. Due to the frequent implication that the racketeers may contribute to harming the target upon failure to pay, the protection racket is generally considered a form of extortion. In some instances, the main potential threat to the target may be caused by the same group that offers to solve it in return for payment, but that fact may sometimes be concealed in order to ensure continual patronage and funding of the crime syndicate by the coerced party. In other cases, depending on the perpetrators' level of influence with authorities and the legality of the business being protected, protection rackets may also offer protection against law enforcement and police involvement, especially if the perpetrators bribe or threaten local law enforcement.
The protection racket mostly sells physical security. Through the credible threat of violence, the racketeers deter both third-party criminals and people in their own criminal organization from swindling, robbing, injuring, sabotaging, or otherwise harming their clients. The racket often occurs in situations and places where criminal threats to certain businesses, entities, or individuals are not effectively prevented or addressed by the prevailing system of law and order or governance, or in cases of inadequate protection by the law for certain ethnic or socioeconomic groups. Protection rackets tend to form in markets in which the law enforcement cannot be counted on to provide legal protection, because of incompetence (as in weak, corrupt, or failed states), illegality (when the targeted entity is involved in black markets), and/or because forms of government distrust exist among the entities involved. Hence, protection rackets are common in places or territories where criminal organizations resemble de facto authorities, or parallel governments. Sicily, Italy is a great example of this phenomenon, where the Cosa Nostra collects protection money locally and resembles a de facto authority, or a parallel government.
Protection rackets are often indistinguishable in practice from extortion rackets, and generally distinguishable from social service and private security by the degree of implied threat; the racketeers themselves may threaten and attack businesses, technological infrastructure, and citizens if the payments are not made. A distinction is possible between a "pure" extortion protection racket, in which the racketeers might agree only not to attack a business or entity, and a broader protection racket offering some real private security in addition to such extortion. In either case, the racketeers generally agree to defend a business or individual from any attack by either themselves or third parties (other criminal gangs). In reality, the distinction between the two types of protection rackets is dubious, because in either case extortion racketeers may have to defend their clients against rival gangs to maintain their profits. By corollary, criminal gangs may have to maintain control of territories (turfs), as local businesses may collapse if forced to pay for protection from too many rackets, which then hurts all parties involved.
Certain scholars, such as Diego Gambetta, classify criminal organizations engaged in protection racketeering as "mafia", as the racket is popular with both the Sicilian Mafia and Italian-American Mafia.




Overview


A protection racket is an operation where racketeers provide protection to persons and properties, settle disputes and enforce contracts in markets where the police and judicial system cannot be relied upon.
Diego Gambetta's The Sicilian Mafia (1996) and Federico Varese's The Russian Mafia (2001) define the mafia as a type of organized crime group that specializes in the provision of private protection.
Protection racketeers or mafia groups operate mostly in the black market, providing buyers and sellers the security they need for smooth transactions; but empirical data collected by Gambetta and Varese suggests that mafia groups are able to offer private protection to corporations and individuals in legal markets when the state fails to offer sufficient and efficient protection to the people in need. Two elements distinguish racketeers from legal security firms. The first element is their willingness to deploy violent forms of retribution (going as far as murder) that fall outside the limits the law normally extends to civilian security firms. The other element is that racketeers are willing to involve themselves in illegal markets.
Recent studies show that mafia groups or gangs are not the only form of protection racket or extra-legal protector, and another important form of protection racket is corrupt networks consisting of public officials, especially those from criminal justice agencies. For example, Wang's The Chinese Mafia (2017) examines protection rackets in China and suggests two types of extra-legal protectors, namely the Black Mafia (local gangs) and the Red Mafia (networks of corrupt government officials). Wang's narrative suggests that local gangs are quasi-law enforcers in both legal and illegal markets, and corrupt public officials are extra-legal protectors, safeguarding local gangs, protecting illegal entrepreneurs in the criminal underworld, offering protection to businesspeople, and selling public appointments to buyers.




Territorial monopolies


A protection racketeer cannot tolerate competition within his sphere of influence from another racketeer. If a dispute erupted between two clients (e.g. businessmen competing for a construction contract) who are protected by rival racketeers, the two racketeers would have to fight each other to win the dispute for their respective clients. The outcomes of such fights can be unpredictable, and neither racketeer would be able to guarantee a victory for his client. This would make their protection unreliable and of little value; their clients would likely dismiss them and settle the dispute by other means. Therefore, racketeers negotiate territories in which they can monopolize the use of violence in settling disputes.: 68–71  These territories may be geographical, or they may be a certain type of business or form of transaction.




Providing genuine protection


Sometimes racketeers will warn other criminals that the client is under their protection and that they will punish anyone who harms the client. Services that the racketeers may offer may include the recovery of stolen property or punishing vandals. The racketeers may even advance the interests of the client by forcing out (or otherwise hindering or intimidating) unprotected competitors.
Protection from theft and vandalism is one service the racketeer may offer. For instance, in Sicily, mafiosi know all the thieves and fences in their territory, and can track down stolen goods and punish thieves who attack their clients.
Protection racketeers establish what they hope will be indefinitely long bonds with their clients. This allows the racketeers to publicly declare a client to be under their protection. Thus, thieves and other predators will have little confusion as to who is and is not protected.
Protection racketeers are not necessarily criminals. In A Short History of Progress, Ronald Wright notes on p. 49, "The warrior caste, supposedly society's protectors, often become protection racketeers. In times of war or crisis, power is easily stolen from the many by the few on a promise of security. The more elusive or imaginary the foe, the better for manufacturing consent."




Examples


Danegeld, was a protection tax paid by Christendom to stop Viking raids.
During the late medieval and early modern era in the Scottish Marches, local farmers would often need to make payments to the Border Reivers as a form of protection money to ensure they were not attacked. These agreements were called "Black mal", where "mal" was an Old Norse word meaning agreement. The word blackmail entered the English language in 1530 as a result, but the word's meaning has changed since.
In Melbourne, Australia, Alphonse Gangitano ran a protection racket along the famous Lygon Street during the 1990s.
In Sicily, Italy, officials say that 80% of businesses in the city of Palermo pay pizzo, or protection money, to the Sicilian Mafia.
In Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, when the Mexican Drug War escalated in 2008, criminal groups like the Juárez Cartel saw their financial backbone threatened and began asking for protection money from businesses ranging from convenience stores to clubs and restaurants with the threat of burning down the business or shooting everyone inside with machine guns.
In the early history of post-Soviet Russia, law enforcement was too underfunded and poorly trained to protect businesses and enforce contracts. Most businesses had to join a protection racket (known as a krysha, the Russian word for "roof") run by local gangsters.
In the United Kingdom in the 1950s and 60s the Kray twins ran protection rackets in the East End of London.
Chauth, demanded by Sambhaji and Peshva Brahmins during Mahratta Invasions of Bengal and Mahratta Sackings of Goa and Bombay-Bassein.




Government protection rackets


Government officials may demand bribes to look the other way or extort something of value from citizens or corporations in the form of a kickback. It need not always be money. A lucrative job after leaving office may have been in exchange for protection offered when in office. Payment may also show up indirectly in the form of a campaign contribution. Stopping government agencies as a whole, and buying protection in the government is called regulatory capture.




See also






References

• Source: Protection Racket

Protection Racket (22 February 1978 – after 1988) was an American-bred Thoroughbred racehorse and sire. He failed to win in three starts as a two-year-old in 1980 but made relentless progress over extended distances in the following year, taking two minor races before winning the Ebor Handicap, Doncaster Cup and Irish St Leger on his last three starts. He remained in training for two more seasons, racing over shorter distances in France and the United States but never won again. He made no impact as a breeding stallion.




Background


Protection Racket was a "strong, rangy" bay horse with no white markings bred in Kentucky by Edward A Seltzer & Alvin Wagner. He initially raced in Seltzer's colours and was sent to Europe where he was trained by Jeremy Hindley at his Clarehaven Stables in Newmarket.
His sire Graustark had a brief but promising racing career before becoming a very successful breeding stallion whose progeny included Prove Out, Key To The Mint, Avatar and Jim French. Protection Racket's dam Protectora was a top-class racemare in Chile before moving to the United States where she won the Nettie Handicap in 1974. She came from a relatively obscure branch of Thoroughbred family 10 which had produced few major winners in Europe since Petrarch.




Racing career






= 1980: two-year-old season

=
After finishing unplaced on his debut over seven furlongs Protection Racket started favourite for the Houghton Stakes at Newmarket Racecourse over the same distance and came home fifth of the fourteen runners behind Sunley Builds. Later that month at the same track he was moved up in distance for a minor race over one mile and finished third behind Video Tape. In their annual Racehorses of 1980 the independent Timeform organisation commented that he was somewhat lacking in pace but looked likely to stay longer distances.




= 1981: three-year-old season

=
As a three-year-old Protection Racket finished second and third in his first two races and then won a maiden race over fourteen furlongs (one and three quarter miles) at Newmarket in May. The colt was then moved up in class and distance for the Queen's Vase over two miles at Royal Ascot and finished second, two and a half lengths behind the Irish-trained Ore. He then won a minor handicap over fourteen furlongs at Yarmouth Racecourse later that month, after which a majority share in the colt was sold to Serge Fradkoff. There was an immediate disagreement between the new owner and the trainer: Hindley believed that the horse's future lay over extreme distances (two miles plus) while Fradkoff wanted to race him over shorter trips. After a break of six weeks he returned at York Racecourse in August for the Ebor Handicap in which he was ridden by Mark Birch and carried a weight of 113 pounds against older and more experienced opponents. Starting at odds of 15/2 he overhauled the long-time leader Shaftesbury a furlong out and held off the late challenge of Another Sam to win by one and a half lengths.
In September Protection Racket bypassed the St Leger Stakes to avoid a clash with Shergar and instead took on older horses in the Doncaster Cup over two and a quarter miles at the same meeting. His task was made considerably easier by the late withdrawal of Ardross and with John Lowe in the saddle he was made the 8/11 favourite against three opponents including the top class hurdler Heighlin (Triumph Hurdle) and the Chester Cup winner Donegal Prince. Protection Racket came home a length and a half ahead of Heighlin in a time of 3:52.7 which broke the course record set in 1949 by Alycidon. On 10 October Brian Taylor took the ride when the colt was sent to the Curragh to contest the Irish St Leger and started 6/4 favourite. Taylor was the stable's preferred jockey but had been unable to ride the horse in his last two races as he had been unable to make the weight. Erins Isle and Ore appeared to be the best of his rivals while other four runners were Bedford, Sailor King, Ashpin and the filly Overplay. Protection Racket overtook the leader Bedford two furlongs out and never looked in any danger of defeat, winning easily by three lengths from Erin's Isle.
In their rankings for 1981 Timeform gave Protecto Racket a rating of 122, nine pounds behind their best stayer Ardross and described him as "a splendidly tough and genuine staying colt and a great credit to his trainer".




= 1982: four-year-old season

=
In 1982 Protection Racket was removed from Hindley's stable and sent to France where he was trained by Olivier Douieb. He was campaigned over middle distances and failed to win in four starts. On his French debut in April he finished second to Gap of Dunloe in the Prix d'Hédouville over 2400 metres at Longchamp Racecourse and then finished sixth to Bikala in the Prix Ganay in the following month. He was equipped with blinkers when he returned to England for the Coronation Cup at Epsom Racecourse in June and finished unplaced behind Easter Sun. On his final appearance of the year at Deauville Racecourse in August he finished fourth in the Prix de Reux. He was reportedly returned to the United Kingdom at the end of the year but was then exported to race in North America.




= 1983: five-year-old season

=
In 1983 Protection Racket was campaigned in the United States where he was trained by Gary Kempler but made little impression in three starts. He finished second in a minor race at Belmont Park in July and was then off the track until November when he finished unplaced in the Knickerbocker Handicap at Aqueduct Racetrack and the Citation Handicap at Hollywood Park Racetrack.




Stud record


At the end of his racing career Protection was retired to become a breeding stallion in the United States. He appears to have attracted very little interest and sired few foals.




Pedigree






References

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