- Source: Ukrainian Legion of Self-Defense
The Ukrainian Self-Defence Legion or Volyn Legion, also Schutzmannschaft Bataillon der Sicherheitspolizei 31 - Ukrainian collaborative volunteer armed formation during World War II.
This was a Ukrainian military formation within the Third Reich's Armed Forces, created in September 1943 on the basis of OUN(m) rebel units in Volhynia, whose command, as a result of a confrontation with the OUN ( b), decided on an agreement with the Germans to protect the Ukrainian population from armed attacks by Polish and Soviet partisans.
Background
In 1942 there was a major split among the Ukrainians in the OUN, which eventually led to the split of the OUN into two hostile factions, the OUN-B and the OUN-M. The main reason for the greater split was the formation of armed units by Andriy Melnyk to fight the Soviet partisans, who were growing in strength, and at the same time to protect the Ukrainian population from German terror. Melnyk's partisans were organised, among others, in Volhynia. The first combat actions were undertaken by it in December 1942. The military units of the OUN-M grew noticeably in strength in the early spring of 1943, when they were joined by many Ukrainian policemen who had abandoned their service to Germany in a mass desertion. The Melnykovts concentrated on fighting Soviet partisans and also carried out actions against the German occupiers. Among others, in January or February 1942, they freed Ukrainians held by the Germans in a prison in Dubna.
According to the memoirs of Maxim Skorupski ("Maks") of the UPA Chickens, during the four months of its existence, the unit of M. Niedzwiecki fought 12 battles and armed skirmishes, of which 10 with the Germans, 1 (May 1, 1943 near Kuty) with the Polish police and 1 (06.4-5.1943) - with the Soviet partisans of S. Kovpak . As a result of these battles, the enemy lost several hundred soldiers . Eventually, in 1943, the Bandera managed to disarm and subjugate part of the aforementioned Melnyk's unit, and part cooperated with the Germans, forming the Legion
The OUN-M leadership took a negative stance towards the mass murders of Poles carried out by the Bandera faction of the OUN and its subordinate Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Nonetheless, there were incidents in Volhynia when the Melnykovists - primarily on the initiative of local commanders - fought Polish partisans and self-defence, and attacked civilians. Among other things, a sotnia under the command of "Bily" took part in a crime in Zabolotce. Other sotnias of the Melnykovs, together with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, carried out massacres of the Polish population in Kąty and in the area of Porycka
In July 1943, the OUN-B, which sought to subjugate all factions of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, proceeded to liquidate the OUN-M Military Troops. In Volhynia, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army units, acting by surprise, surrounded and disarmed the Melnykov sotnias of "Chrin" and "Bily". Some officers and partisans were conscripted into the ranks of the UPA. Those who refused were brutally murdered by the OUN Security Service.
The story of the Legion's formation began with the arrest of a liaison officer nicknamed 'Okun' by a detachment of Polish auxiliary police. Due to the considerable amount of OUN-M agitation and propaganda material found in the detainee, the Poles handed "Okun" over to the Lutsk Gestapo. Mychajlo Soltys ("Cherkas"), one of the leaders of the residents of Mielnikovo in the Lutsk region, found out about the case quite quickly and immediately sent a letter to the Gestapo threatening widespread and all-out terror against the representatives of the German authorities and the Wehrmacht. Surprisingly, the answer to this kind of ultimatum came from "Okun" himself, who also reported that the Germans, or rather the Lutsk SD, had offered to negotiate.
The district assembly, convened by the leadership of the hundreds of Melnikovs, decided that such negotiations could be undertaken and appointed "Cherkas" as head of the Ukrainian delegation. In September 1943, a meeting between Melnikov residents and the Germans took place in one of the suburban cemeteries in Lutsk.The next meeting was held in a week's time. The Ukrainian side agreed to local cooperation, but set a number of conditions:
Organisation of a strong military division.
The department will operate in Volhynia in a partisan character.
The tasks of the division will be only to fight against Soviet partisans and to defend the Ukrainian population against Polish armed formations.
The German command fully covers all the needs of the division in terms of ammunition, uniforms and weapons.
The command of the department is exercised exclusively by Ukrainians, the German command does not interfere in the internal life of the department.
The department will not fight the Germans if they do not commit any excesses against the Ukrainian population of the region and do not make arrests.
The German command will release all Ukrainian political prisoners from Volhynian prisons A third meeting took place a few days later, at which the Germans agreed to the Ukrainian side's proposals.
Probably in August 1943, a partisan unit was formed in Volhynia from among members of the OUN-M field structures who had been denounced by the OUN Security Service. It was headed by Mychajło Sołtys, pseud. 'Cherkas', and Arjon Poliszczuk, pseud. 'Neczaj'. Soon afterwards, one of Melnykov's liaison officers fell into the hands of the Germans, which drew the attention of the Sicherheitsdienst to the unit. In the second half of August or early September in the cemetery in the village of Milosz the first meeting took place between representatives of the Lutsk OUN-M Provincial and officers of the local SD. Further talks took place in Lutsk. Eventually an agreement was made whereby the Melnykovists agreed to form a unit to fight Soviet and Polish partisans in cooperation with the Germans. In return, the Germans agreed to release the arrested Melnykovites and declared that they would limit repressions against the local Ukrainian population.
Name
Initially, the ULS appeared under the name Rejdujczyj Viddil, but as early as spring1944 German reports refer to it as Kampfgruppe Assmussi Sonderheit Assmuss and even Melnikkam pfgruppe. According to some historians, the unit was also called the Volhynian Legion or the Volhynian Self-Defence Legion. It is difficult to determine at what point the nameUkrainian Self-Defence Legion came into use, but it was probably no later than June 1944. During this period, the Germans in particular began to use the name Ukrainische Selbstschutz Legion and the 31st SMdS Bataillon1. In the literature one can also find the name 31st SD Battalion (used by Kost' B ondarenko2) or 31st Schum a (Schutzmannschaft), which is recorded in German sources.
Formation activities
Organisationally, the legion consisted of three militia and one economic hundred (the commanders were centurions "Nechay", Mykhailo Karkots, Yu. Makukh and O. Gunya). The total number of fighters is about 500, according to other data more than 1000. The unit was armed with rifles, 20 handguns and 2 machine guns and 2 anti-tank guns. Formally, the ULS was considered a motorised unit, but instead of cars it only had peasant carts. A sub-school was first established at the Legion and, from the summer of 1944, a college . The Legion even published its own magazine, "The Ukrainian Legion"
= Volhynia
=
Until the end of November 1943, the "Cherkas"-"Nechai" unit carried out independent activities, aimed primarily at recruiting volunteers and maintaining OUN-M influence in the region. At the beginning of December, the unit was transported in German vehicles to Podhajce, where the formation of the legion began. The Germans provided the newly formed unit with uniforms and supplies. It was also joined by two German liaison officers who had previously participated in the negotiations for the establishment of the Legion: SS-Hauptsturmführer Siegfried Assmuss and SS-Oberscharführer Gustav Rauling. In January 1944, the former was appointed German commander of the Legion (the Ukrainian commander remained 'Cherkas'). Thanks to the recruitment of volunteers, the size of the unit doubled.
Initially, the Legion fought against Soviet partisans in the Cumania area. At the end of January 1944, it was redeployed to the Lutsk region. It was then expanded to 2-3 sotnias. However, due to the advances of the Red Army, it had to be withdrawn to the west: first to Torczyn, then to Uściługa. In February 1944, it fought against Soviet partisans and the Polish 27th Volhynian Infantry Division of the Home Army. In these battles it showed low combat value, and its losses reached from a few dozen to 100 men (up to 30% of its personnel). On February 15, during an anti-apartheid operation ordered by the Germans against the 27th ID of the Home Army, members of the Legion pacified the Karczunek colony inhabited by Poles, murdering between 30 and 60 of its inhabitants.
= Lubelskie and Małopolskie
=
At the end of February 1944, the Legion was transferred to the western bank of the Bug River. At the end of February 1944, its subunits were stationed in quarters in the villages of Moroczyn and Dziekanów in the Hrubieszów district. The following month it was expanded to battalion level. It was then that the name 'Ukrainian Self-Defence Legion' probably took effect. Colonel Oleksander Kwitko became the new Ukrainian military commander, while 'Cherkas' remained the political leader of the formation. The Legion henceforth consisted of three sotnias: two line sotnias under the command of Mykhailo Karkoć a.k.a. "Wowk" and Yuri Makuch a.k.a. "Makuch", and a school sotnia under the command of Roman Kiveljuk a.k.a. "Voron". In addition, an artillery subunit, a reconnaissance group, a field hospital, gendarmerie, a field court, and a non-commissioned officer school were formed, headed by Petro Oksentiw pseud. "Terlica". The ULS even published its own magazine, Ukrayinskyi Legioner, of which Volodymyr Trojan, alias "Trojan", was the editor. In June or July 1944, the new military commander of the Legion was Colonel Volodymyr Herasymenko, pseud. "Tur".
The Legion stayed intermittently in the Lublin region until the end of June 1944. During this time, it fought against Polish and Soviet partisans, including above all the 1st Battalion of the Hrubieszów BCh Troops commanded by Stanisław Basaj, pseud. "Ryś". During these activities, its members committed war crimes. On 26 March 1944, the legionaries murdered five Poles - refugees from Volhynia - whom they met by chance. The following day, during an anti-apartheid operation against the "Ryś" unit, together with officers of other German and Ukrainian police formations, they pacified the village of Smoligów, murdering between 70 and 230 inhabitants. After this operation, the Legion was temporarily moved back to Volhynia twice - in April and May. During the first of these expeditions, together with a German Grenzschutz unit, it set up an ambush on a Ukrainian Insurgent Army unit near the village of Łudzin. He returned to the Hrubieszów region in June or early July 1944.
In the first days of August 1944, the ULS took up quarters in the village of Bukowska Wola in the Miechow district. In the meantime, there were some personnel changes in its command. On 24 July, the German authorities appointed SS-Sturmbannführer Ewald Biegelmayer in place of the slain Assmuss. Colonel Petro Diachenko also joined the Legion (according to other sources, this had already happened in June). This officer - enjoying, according to some sources, a great deal of trust from the SD - became chief of staff and deputy commander of the ULS. At the same time, the expansion of the formation was underway. The number of line companies (sotnias) increased to four. A cavalry chota (platoon) was also created, and an HMG company on the basis of an artillery subunit. By August 1944, the ULS numbered between 600 and 900 officers and soldiers. However, the expansion of the unit was accompanied by a progressive dependence on the Germans. The Melnykovites were unable to provide the newly formed subunits with suitably qualified officers and non-commissioned officers, hence on the one hand the increase in the number of SD officers assigned to the ULS, and on the other hand the influx of former supporters of Symon Petlura, who felt greater loyalty to the Germans than to the OUN-M leadership.
The relocation of the Legion from the partially Ukrainian-populated areas on the Bug River to the ethnically Polish environs of Miechów caused great dissatisfaction in the ranks of the formation. This resulted in, among other things, cases of desertion. The situation was aggravated by the conduct of Biegelmayer, who, unlike his predecessor, made no secret of the fact that he regarded the ULS solely as a tool in the hands of the Sicherheitspolizei. During its stay in the Miechów area, the ULS took part several times in actions against Polish partisans from the Pinczow Republic. During one of these actions, on 5 August 1944, the legionaries murdered 11 inhabitants of the village of Szarbia
= Dispute with OUN-B
=
The confrontation between Melnikov's Legion and the Bandera UPA continued. Thus, at the beginning of April 1944, the ULS engaged in a battle with an UPA unit in the village of Ludyn in the Vladimir district. As a result of the battle, two soldiers were killed and one was seriously wounded .
In the first half of May, the Legion, after carrying out reconnaissance, left Moroczyn and Diakonów, crossed the Bug River and quickly marched to the Bubno district, Byskupych Szlachetskie (now the village of Sosnina, Iwaneczow district, Volyn region), Iwanecze . The regrouping of the Legion itself fulfilled another task of the Germans - the activity of UPA units in the area fell sharply. In addition, in July 1944, a large UPA unit approached the Legion's command with a request to join its ranks, albeit with the demand to remain a single combat unit. In response to the ULS command's reply that the division would be dispersed among the Legion's other units, the Bandera people did not agree to such conditions, although a few ordinary soldiers voluntarily joined the ULS. On 16 July, the first graduation ceremony of the ULS Gymnasium was held in Byskupychy, accompanied by a solemn prayer and parade.
= Warsaw
=
The largest compact Ukrainian unit that the German command sent to Warsaw was the Ukrainian Self-Defence Legion (ukr. Український Легіон Самооборони), also appearing under the German name Schützmannschaft Bataillon der Sipo 31.
The order to take part in suppressing the Polish uprising reached the Legion in the second half of August 1944. There was a tense atmosphere in the ranks of the unit at the time, the reason for which was an earlier decision by the Germans to redeploy the unit from the partially Ukrainian-populated Bug River lands to the ethnically Polish environs of Miechow. The political leadership of the ULS opposed the order to go to Warsaw because, in its view, it dismissed the prospect of fighting for Ukrainian independence and, at the same time, reduced the Legion solely to the role of a German police unit. Consequently, one of the political leaders of the ULS, Mykhailo Soltys alias "Cherkas", disappeared without news, most likely detained and murdered by the Gestapo. Another leader, Volodymyr Trojan, deserted, having previously unsuccessfully urged ULS members to follow in his footsteps. Eventually, in a demonstration of strength, the Germans surrounded Bukovskaya Volya, where the Legion was quartered. The Ukrainian unit was then dismembered, and a separate fighting group was formed from among the policemen and sent to Warsaw. It was headed by Colonel Petro Diachenko, an officer recently assigned to the ULS who, according to some sources, had strong ties with the German Sicherheitsdienst.
Along with Diachenko, about one-third of the ULS personnel went to Warsaw; they were probably volunteers or people selected by the German command as "troublemakers". According to German sources, 219 policemen participated in the suppression of the uprising, while Hubert Kuberski is inclined to estimate their number at as many as around 400.
The ULS most likely found its way to Warsaw in early September 1944 and fought there for about 2–3 weeks. Determining exactly how its combat route unfolded, however, raises a number of difficulties. It is likely that the Legionaries first took part in the German assault on Powisle, taking up positions in the area of what was then 6 Sierpnia Street or Rozbrat Street. Then, from 13 August, they took part in the fighting in Solec. It is possible that the ULS then occupied positions between the present-day park of Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły and the bank of the Vistula, from where they advanced northwards towards Wilanowska and Ludna Streets. It is possible, however, that it initially remained entrenched on Wybrzeze Kosciuszkowskie, from where it was later moved to the area east of Frascati Street. Its opponents at the time were Home Army soldiers from the "Radoslaw" and/or "Kryska" groupings, as well as landing sub-units of the 1st Polish Army.
According to German figures, between 4 and 13 September the ULS suffered losses of 10 killed and 34 wounded (20% of its personnel). Legionnaires interviewed after the war, on the other hand, estimated their unit's losses at around 20-30 dead. Hubert Kuberski speculates that the ULS must have suffered the greatest losses during the fighting in Solec.
Of the war crimes committed by the Germans and their collaborators in Warsaw, only one can be indisputably attributed to the ULS policemen, i.e. the rape and murder of three Polish women at 23 Bednarska St. They were also accused of murdering the patients and staff of one of the insurgent hospitals in the Powisle Czerniakowskie district, however, due to the fact that the source of this accusation is a propaganda publication that was published after the war in the USSR, it cannot be considered fully credible. At the same time, however, it cannot be completely disavowed, as it is not excluded that the author of this publication had access to protocols of testimonies of former legionaries found in the KGB archives.
After the end of fighting in Powisle, the unit was redeployed to the Leszno region on the outskirts of the Kampinos Forest. The task of the ULS was henceforth to fight the "Kampinos" Home Army Group. Initially, the Ukrainian policemen were part of a cordon surrounding the forest. From 27 September, however, they participated in the counter-partisan operation Sternschnuppe.
= Subsequent Fate
=
While Diachenko's combat group was fighting in Warsaw, the "Makuch" sotnia was conducting counter-partisan operations in the vicinity of Nowy Sącz, Krynica and Czorsztyn. In the following weeks, all ULS subunits were again concentrated, this time in the village of Targowisko in the Bocheński foothills. The Legion continued to be used to fight Polish partisans; for example, in January 1945 it took part in clashes near Zakopane.
In the same month, the ULS was redeployed to Cieszyn and from there to Ostrava. At the beginning of February 1945, its subdivisions were transported by rail via Vienna to Maribor in Slovenia. The Legion's task from then on was to fight the communist partisans under Josip Broz Tito.
Shortly afterwards, the German authorities undertook to incorporate the ULS into the 14th SS Grenadier Division, composed of Ukrainians. The vision of being incorporated into a unit that was under even tighter German control than the ULS enraged many Legionnaires. The situation was aggravated by the conduct of Biegelmayer, who decided to personally announce the decision of the German command to the soldiers, but his ill-considered speech further aggravated the prevailing atmosphere in the unit. As a result, some 250 legionaries under Roman Kiveljuk, pseud. 'Voron' (2/3 of the ULS) deserted with the intention of joining the Serbian Chetniks. However, the latter, with whom these plans had not been consulted beforehand, refused to cooperate and alerted the Maribor Gestapo outpost. The deserters were led by the Chetniks out into the open, where they were soon surrounded by Germans and soldiers of the 14th SS DGren. At one point there was a shootout in which one of the deserters was wounded. Eventually, after negotiations in which Lubomyr Makarushka played a key role, 'Voron', in return for a promise of amnesty, decided to lay down his arms with his comrades and return to his home unit. Shortly afterwards, despite earlier guarantees of safety, the provost of the desertion was killed by the Germans in unclear circumstances
In March 1945, the ULS was finally disbanded and incorporated into the 14th SS DGren. Officers and non-commissioned officers were incorporated into the division's reserve battalion, while the rank-and-file soldiers were dispersed to individual subdivisions. In May 1945, the former Legionnaires, together with the other soldiers of the 14th SS DGren, found themselves in Allied captivity. They did not share the fate of the members of other eastern collaborationist formations, who were handed over to the Soviets. Many, however, voluntarily decided to return to Poland or the USSR. Others remained in exile in Western countries
Bibliography
Hubert Kuberski: Nieniemieccy ochotnicy w Ostheer, Waffen SS i policji walczący w rejonie Warszawy oraz podczas tłumienia Powstania Warszawskiego (lipiec–październik 1944 roku). W: Joanna Szymoniczek (red.): Jak patrzeć na Polskę, Niemcy i świat? Księga jubileuszowa profesora Eugeniusza Cezarego Króla. Warszawa: Bellona i Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2017. ISBN 978-83-11-10292-7
Каліберда Ю., Федько А., Федько Ю. Збройні формування ОУН-Мельника у 1943—1944 рр. на Волині
Marcin Majewski. Przyczynek do wojennych dziejów Ukraińskiego Legionu Samoobrony (1943–1945). „Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość”. 4/2 (8), 2005. ISSN 1427-7476
Marcin Majewski: Ukraińskie formacje zbrojne w służbie niemieckiej (Sipo, Orpo, Waffen SS) na Lubelszczyźnie w 1944 r. W: Marek Białokur, Mariusz Patelski: Podzielone narody. Szkice z historii stosunków polsko-ukraińskich w latach 40. XX wieku. Toruń-Opole: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek i Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne, 2010. ISBN 978-83-7611-828-4
Grzegorz Motyka: Prawda i mity o udziale Ukraińców w zwalczaniu Powstania Warszawskiego. W: Kazimierz Krajewski, Tomasz Łabuszewski (red.): Powstanie Warszawskie. Fakty i mity. Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2006. ISBN 83-60464-03-0
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