- Source: Preterintention
Preterintention in criminal law is a degree of culpability in which a defendant intended to commit a crime but also unintentionally committed a more serious crime. It derives from the legal Latin phrase praeter intentionem, which means "beyond intention". Preterintentional crimes or offenses may also be referred to as result-conditioned or consequentially aggravated. A common form of preterintentional crime is bodily harm resulting in death, in which the defendant intended to harm the victim but did not intend to kill.
Preterintentional crime as a distinct legal concept is found chiefly in penal systems of the civil law tradition. It arises from the Roman legal principle under which a criminal intent created strict criminal liability for all resulting harm, which is often known by the maxim versari in re illicita. In modern times many legal systems have ceased to impose separate criminal liability for preterintentional crimes. Other legal systems have limited a defendant's criminal liability to situations where the defendant negligently or recklessly caused the preterintentional harm.
Penal systems of the common law tradition generally do not use the concept of preterintentionality, but some common law systems impose criminal penalties for unintended harms under doctrines such as felony murder.
History
Strict criminal liability for preterintentional crimes can be traced back to the doctrine of "versari in re illicita", and found application both in the criminal law of ancient Rome, and in the canon law of the Roman Church.
In Roman law, the perpetrator of a criminal act who unintentionally committed a more serious but causally connected crime was still punished for the unintended crime, without it being necessary to establish willfull intent to commit the more serious offense. The person was held strictly criminally liable for the preterintentional crime; thus, it was sufficient to ascertain that the preterintentional crime had been caused by an intentional act.
Elements
A preterintentional crime requires an intentional criminal act or omission, and an unintended and more serious outcome. Under some legal systems, a defendant is not criminally liable for the unintended outcome unless the defendant acted with negligent or reckless disregard for that outcome.
= Intentional conduct
=A preterintentional crime requires an intentional act or omission in violation of criminal law. However, this intentional criminal conduct does not have to be successful: a mere intentional attempt at a crime can be sufficient. The judge can condemn the agent for the preterintentional crime caused by the intentional criminal conduct, even if only attempted. For example: Tizio with a threatening attitude makes a sudden movement of his arms with a closed hand towards Caio, and the latter with a reflex movement avoids the blow but stumbles and, falling to the ground, hits his head and dies; the intended crime of assult against Caio is only attempted and not completed, but Tizio is still responsible for the preterintentional homicide of Caio. A criminal attempt, in addition to being sufficient, is also indispensable for the agent to be convicted of a preterintentional crime.
Conversely, an attempted preterintentional crime is logically impossible: if the preterintentional event does not occur, there is no preterintentional crime, and the perpetrator is responsible only for the intended lesser offense, because that is the only crime they committed.
Because a subject cannot be punished twice for the same act, the penalty may be determined taking into account both the crime intended and the preterintentional crime committed.
= State of mind
=Some countries, such as Austria, in order to adapt preterintention to the principle of subjective responsibility, no one can be punished criminally unless as a result of voluntary or at least reckless, negligent or unskilled responsibility, consider preterintention as a form of mixed mental state. The intent supports the conduct of the lesser crime, and fault supports the preterintentional consequence.
In the United States, faithful to the ontological nature of preterintention, it is considered a form of intentional crime, aggravated by the unintentional event which is attributed to the author even if theydid not want the event, thus introducing a form of objective responsibility.
By type
= Preterintentional killing
=The main example of this form of liability is preterintentional killing, which occurs when a person, with actions aimed at hitting or harming, unintentionally causes the death of a person: the agent will be liable for objective responsibility, or fault, for the laws that require it, for the death event. For example: Tizio argues with Caio and intentionally punches him, Caio falls to the ground and dies: Tizio only wanted to punch him and absolutely did not want to kill him.
In praeterintentional homicide the term "killing" is used and not that of "murder", as in intentional homicide, in order to underline the agent's unwillingness to kill.
Preterintentional homicide can mature under certain factual circumstances, and therefore the penalty will be aggravated according to the type of circumstance ascertained by the judge: for example, the Italian legislator regulates the aggravating circumstances of preterintentional killing in art. 585 penal code, and the French one in art. 222-8 penal code.
= Preterintentional abortion
=Another hypothesis expressly provided for by the law is preterintentional abortion, which occurs when the agent, with actions aimed at causing injury, causes, as an unintended effect, the interruption of pregnancy. For exmample, Tizio argues with Mevia and intentionally punches her, causing Mevia to fall to the ground and miscarry. Tizio only wanted to punch Mevia but did not want to cause the miscarriage of the child in her womb.
= Crimes aggravated by the event
=Then there are the preterintentional crimes in the broad sense: intentional crimes aggravated by an unwanted harmful or dangerous event, which reproduce the typical preterintentional criminal progression: intentional unlawful conduct that produces a more serious involuntary crime. For example: Tizio intentionally slaps his daughter Filena, and Filena suffers serious injuries so much so that she goes to the hospital; in the following days Filena dies from complications from infections on the injuries sustained.
By penal system
The concept of preterintentional crime is found primarily in legal systems of the civil law tradition. Preterintentional crimes are or have formerly been recognized by many countries, including the following:
In French criminal law, examples of preterintentional offense, dol dépassé, include fatal violence under Article 222-7 of the penal code. As in many countries, this form of homicide receives a sentence that is midway in severity between negligent and intentional killing.
In the German criminal code, preterintentional or "result-qualified" offenses, erfolgsqualifizierte Delikte, include the crimes of bodily harm resulting in death, arson resulting in death, and kidnapping resulting in death. Under German law a preterintentional offense requires at least a negligent state of mind.
Under Italian law, Article 42 of the Italian Penal Code provides that preterintentional crimes cannot be punished unless expressly provided by law. The Code does provide for a punishment of ten to eighteen years for preterintentional homicide under Article 584, which has not been substantively amended since the modern Code was adopted in 1930. Preterintention is specified in Article 43 of the Code as a third culpable state of mind alongside negligence and intent, but preterintentional homicide is the only preterintentional crime defined in the Code.
In Dutch criminal law, preterintentional crimes include lethal injury, art. 302 s.2 DPC.
Other legal systems that recognize preterintentional crimes include those of Georgia, where preterintentional crimes require at least negligence, Colombia, and Venezuela.
Many civil law legal systems have rejected preterintentional offenses and the underlying doctrine of versari in re illicita, as reflecting a strict liability approach incompatible with modern constitutional guarantees. In some countries including Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, preterintentional crimes have been split into their intentional and unintentional parts, and therefore defendants are charged with a voluntary crime for the intentional act, e.g. grave bodily harm, and an involuntary crime for the resulting unintended harm, e.g. negligent homicide. Some legal scholars have argued that cases in which someone commits an preterintentional offence must be regulated, as a legal vacuum is unacceptable.
Other countries in which preterintentional crimes were formerly recognized but have been abolished or greatly limited include South Africa and Botswana, both of which rejected the traditional versari principle in the 1960s as embodying a form of strict liability not compatible with modern approaches to criminal law. In South African criminal law, the state of mind necessary for a defendant to be criminally responsible for an unintended consequence of a criminal act is dolus eventualis, which requires both foreseeing the potential for harm and acting in reckless disregard of the consequences. The courts of Zimbabwe and Namibia have similarly adopted a requirement that a defendant foresee the reasonable possibility of the preterintentional harm occurring.
Countries of the common law tradition have typically followed a comparatively flexible approach to preterintentional crimes. In United States criminal law, depending on the state, preterintentional offenses may include felony murder and voluntary manslaughter. In English criminal law, preterintentional crimes are generally punished where there is sufficient similarity between the intended crime and the result. This approach is justified based on the doctrines of "unforeseen mode", "mistaken object", and "transferred fault".
