• Source: Sanctions during the Venezuelan crisis

During the crisis in Venezuela, the United States applied sanctions against specific Venezuelan government entities and individuals associated with the administration of Nicolás Maduro, along with sanctions applied by the European Union (E.U.), Canada, Mexico, Panama and Switzerland. By September 2019, the Center for Strategic and International Studies said 119 Venezuelans had been sanctioned by the U.S. and several other countries.
Early sanctions came in response to repression during the 2014 and the 2017 Venezuelan protests, and activities both during the 2017 Constituent Assembly election and the 2018 presidential election. Sanctions were placed on current and former government officials, including members of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) and the 2017 Constituent National Assembly (ANC), members of the military and security forces, and private individuals accused of being involved in human rights abuses, degradation in the rule of law, repression of democracy, and corruption. Canada and the E.U. began applying sanctions in 2017.
In August 2017, the administration of Donald Trump imposed sanctions which prohibited Venezuela's access to U.S. financial markets, and in May 2018, expanded them to block purchase of Venezuelan debt. Beginning in January 2019, during the Venezuelan presidential crisis, the U.S. applied additional economic sanctions to individuals or companies in the petroleum, gold, mining, and banking industries and a food subsidy program; other countries also applied sanctions in response to the presidential crisis.
Companies in the petroleum sector evaded the sanctions on Venezuela's state-owned oil company, PDVSA, to continue oil shipments. In October 2023, the administration of Joe Biden temporarily lifted some U.S. sanctions on the oil, gas and gold industries in exchange for the promise of the release of political prisoners and free 2024 elections. Most of the sanctions were reimposed in April when the U.S. State Department said the Barbados Agreement to hold free elections had not been fully honored, although waivers were allowed to some companies in the form of individual licenses to continue operating in the oil sector.




United States






= History and legislation

=

The U.S. had been concerned about Venezuelan narcotics trafficking since 2005 and Venezuela's lack of cooperation in combatting terrorism since 2006. In 2008, Executive Order (EO) 13224 aimed to reduce terrorist funding in Venezuela via sanctions; the United States Department of the Treasury has used the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act to sanction at least 22 Venezuelans as of 2019.
Prior to the ongoing crisis in Venezuela, the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three current or former Venezuelan government officials in 2008, saying there was evidence they had materially helped the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in the illegal drug trade.
In 2011, four allies of Hugo Chávez were sanctioned for allegedly helping FARC obtain weapons and smuggle drugs.
U.S. President Barack Obama signed the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014, imposing sanctions on Venezuelan individuals held responsible by the U.S. for human rights violations during the 2014 Venezuelan protests. On 2 February 2015, the United States Department of State imposed visa restrictions on Venezuelan officials that were linked to alleged human rights abuses and political corruption.




= On individuals

=
As of 7 August 2023, the Congressional Research Service said the U.S. maintained sanctions on more than 110 individuals.



2015

Barack Obama issued a presidential order on 9 March 2015 declaring Venezuela a "threat to [U.S.] national security", and ordered the Treasury Department to freeze property and assets of seven Venezuelan officials it held responsible for human rights abuses, repression and at least 43 deaths during demonstrations.
In March 2015, the Obama administration imposed asset and visa sanctions against 110 Venezuelan individuals, and eight entities.



2017


Tareck El Aissami, Vice President of Economy and Minister for National Industry and Production, and his frontman Samark Jose Lopez Bello were named in February as significant international narcotics traffickers. Five U.S. companies in Florida and an airplane registered in the U.S. were also blocked.
The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Maikel Moreno and seven members of the Venezuelan Supreme Justice Tribunal (TSJ) in May for usurping the functions of the Venezuelan National Assembly and permitting Maduro to govern by decree.
In July, thirteen senior officials of the Venezuelan government associated with the 2017 Venezuelan Constituent Assembly elections were sanctioned for what the U.S. labeled as their role in undermining democracy and human rights. Those sanctioned included Tibisay Lucena, President of the Maduro-controlled National Electoral Council (CNE); Néstor Reverol, Minister of Interior and former Commander General of Venezuelan National Guard (GNB); and Tarek William Saab, Ombudsman and President of Moral Council. The U.S. State Department condemned that election and refused to recognize it. The day after the election, the U.S. sanctioned Maduro.
The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned eight officials associated with the 2017 Constituent National Assembly (ANC) in August, including Adán Chávez, the brother of Hugo Chávez.
In November, ten more government officials were added to OFAC's list of Venezuelans sanctioned after the regional elections.



2018


The U.S. Treasury Department said on 5 January that corruption and repression continued in Venezuela and four senior military officers were sanctioned. Four more current or former officials were added to the sanctioned list in March 2018.
Just before the May 2018 Venezuelan presidential election, the U.S. sanctioned four Venezuelans and three companies it said were involved in corruption and money laundering including Diosdado Cabello, Chavismo's number two person and President of the ANC, and Cabello's wife and brother. Fourteen properties owned or controlled by Rafael Sarria in Florida and New York were also sanctioned.
The U.S. Treasury Department seized a private jet and imposed sanctions on Maduro's inner circle in September. Maduro's wife, Cilia Flores, Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López, Vice President Delcy Rodríguez, and her brother Jorge Rodríguez, Minister of Communications, were sanctioned.



2019


On 8 January, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned seven individuals who they said were benefitting from a corrupt currency exchange scheme. OFAC also sanctioned Venezuelan private TV network Globovisión and other companies owned or controlled by Raúl Gorrín and Gustavo Perdomo.
On 15 February 2019, officials of Maduro's security and intelligence were sanctioned along with Manuel Quevedo, the head of PDVSA.
During the February 2019 shipping of humanitarian aid to Venezuela, four Venezuelan state governors were added to the sanctions list. On 1 March, six more military and security forces individuals who the U.S. alleged helped obstruct the delivery of humanitarian aid were blacklisted .
The president of Minerven, Venezuela's state-run mining company, Adrian Antonio Perdomo was sanctioned in March 2019.
The U.S. Treasury added sanctions on 17 April to the Central Bank of Venezuela and one of its directors, Iliana Ruzza, to two Central Bank directors already sanctioned. Maduro said the sanctions were "totally illegal".
On 26 April 2019, the U.S. Treasury accused Maduro's foreign minister Jorge Arreaza and Judge Carol Padilla of exploiting the U.S. financial system to support Maduro, and blacklisted them.
Following the Venezuelan uprising on 30 April 2019, the U.S. removed sanctions against former SEBIN chief Manuel Cristopher Figuera, who broke ranks with Maduro.
The U.S. sanctioned two former Venezuelan government officials, Luis Alfredo Motta Domínguez and Eustiquio Jose Lugo Gomez, on 27 June alleging they were engaging in significant corruption and fraud.
President Maduro's son, Nicolás Maduro Guerra, was sanctioned on 28 June 2019 as a member of Venezuela's Constituent Assembly.
Following the June death while in custody of Venezuelan navy captain Rafael Acosta Arévalo, the U.S. sanctioned Dirección General de Contrainteligencia Militar (DGCIM) on 11 July 2019, accusing the defense agency of being responsible for his death. On 19 July 2019, additional DGCIM officials were sanctioned.
Five politicians and security officials, who had earlier been sanctioned by the E.U. or Canada, were added to the U.S. sanctions list on 5 November 2019 for alleged corruption and violence during opposition protests.



2020


The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned seven individuals for their involvement in the disputed January 2020 Venezuelan National Assembly Delegated Committee election that resulted in two claims for the Presidency of the National Assembly: one by legislator Luis Parra, later supported by Maduro, and one by the incumbent Juan Guaidó. Those sanctioned in addition to Parra included Franklyn Duarte and José Brito.
On 22 September 2020, the U.S. Treasury described five sanctioned individuals as supporting, manipulating and rigging the upcoming 2020 Venezuelan parliamentary elections.
The company Ex-Cle Soluciones Biometricas CA, and individuals associated with it, were sanctioned on 18 December for providing services for the 2020 parliamentary election.
OFAC sanctioned the president and board chairman, Didier Casimiro, of Rosneft on 18 February 2020, for supporting Maduro's government by operating in the oil sector.
On 26 March 2020, the U.S. State Department offered a $15 million reward on Nicolás Maduro, and $10 million each on Diosdado Cabello, Hugo Carvajal, Clíver Alcalá Cordones and Tareck El Aissami, for information to bring those individuals to justice for alleged drug trafficking and narco-terrorism.
Two friends of Maduro and his son, Nicolas Ernesto Maduro Guerra, were sanctioned on 23 July 2020 for their alleged role in an illicit gold scheme.



2024


Following the declaration without evidence by Venezuela's National Electoral Council (CNE) and validation by the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) that Maduro had won the 28 July 2024 presidential election, condemned as fraudulent, the U.S. began reviewing a list of 60 individuals and their family members for possible sanctions.
On 12 September 16 individuals associated with Maduro and the subsequent repression were sanctioned. Among the sanctioned were five members of the TSJ, the lower-court judge who issued a warrant for the arrest of opposition candidate Edmundo González, the CNE, and "military and intelligence officials accused of post-election repression".
Caryslia Rodríguez, the head of the TSJ who issued the ruling validating Maduro's win, was sanctioned along with Edward Miguel Briceño Cisneros and Luis Ernesto Dueñez Reyes, the judge and prosecutor responsible for the arrest warrant against González




= On industries

=
Trump issued EO 13850 on 1 November 2018 to block the assets of anyone involved in alleged corruption in the gold sector, or "any other sector of the economy as determined in the future by the Secretary of the Treasury". Mnuchin announced on 28 January 2019 that EO 13850 applied to the petroleum sector.
Three additional Executive Orders were applied in 2017 and 2018. EO 13808, issued on 27 July 2017, prohibits the Venezuelan government from accessing U.S. financial markets, allowing for "exceptions to minimize the impact on the Venezuelan people and U.S. economic interests." Issued in 2018, EO 13827 prohibited the use of Venezuelan digital currency, and EO 13835 prohibited the purchase of Venezuelan debt.



Petroleum


Trump imposed economic sanctions in August 2017 that affected Venezuela's petroleum industry by prohibiting the trading of Venezuelan bonds in U.S. markets. The New York Times said that loopholes in the sanctions would permit "financing of most commercial trade ... and financing for humanitarian services to the Venezuelan people", and quoted analysts who said the sanctions would not be a "lethal blow". The White House saw the measures as a way to "protect the United States financial system from complicity in Venezuela's corruption and in the impoverishment of the Venezuelan people" without disallowing humanitarian aid while preventing the "fire sale" of Venezuelan assets.
The U.S. imposed additional sanctions on PDVSA on 28 January 2019 to pressure Maduro to resign during the 2019 Venezuelan presidential crisis. The sanctions prevented PDVSA from being paid for petroleum exports to the U.S., froze $7 billion of PDVSA's U.S. assets and prevented U.S. firms from exporting naphtha to Venezuela. Bolton estimated the expected loss to the Venezuelan economy at more than $11 billion in 2019.
In February 2019, Maduro ordered PDVSA to move its European office to Moscow to protect its overseas assets from U.S. sanctions. The Russian state-run oil company Rosneft had supplied naphtha to Venezuela and continued to purchase Venezuelan petroleum, which it said was through contracts that were in place prior to the U.S. sanctions. Exports of Venezuela's heavy crude oil depend on diluents that were imported from the U.S. before sanctions; Rosneft chartered a ship to load thinners from Malta and deliver them to Venezuela on 22 March, and arranged for Venezuelan crude oil to be processed in India. Other companies including India's Reliance Industries Limited, Spain's Repsol, and commodity trading companies Trafigura and Vitol continued to supply Venezuela's oil industry as of 11 April 2019.
On 18 February 2020, OFAC sanctioned Rosneft Trading S.A. for supporting Maduro's government by operating in the oil sector, and added a Swiss subsidiary of Rosneft, TNK Trading International S.A., on 12 March.
During the management of the interim president Juan Guaidó, the Venezuelan National Assembly had been looking at ways to access Venezuela's overseas cash and facilities. PDVSA's US subsidiary Citgo announced in February 2019 that it would formally cut ties with PDVSA to comply with U.S. sanctions. Guaidó and the National Assembly appointed a new Citgo board of directors. Although control of PDVSA assets in Venezuela remained with Maduro, Guaidó named a new PDVSA board. With Citgo under the control of Guaidó's administration, the U.S. extended its license to operate in spite of sanctions.
Reuters reported on 18 April 2019 that the Maduro administration was bypassing sanctions by funneling cash from petroleum sales through Russia's Rosneft. Reliance denied reports that it was in violation of U.S. sanctions and stated that its purchases of Venezuelan oil through Rosneft were approved by the U.S. State Department. April oil exports were steady at a million barrels daily, "partially due to inventory drains", with most shipments to buyers from India and China. With sanctions, shipments to Cuba were unchanged.
Beginning in late 2019, the US asked foreign firms not to send gasoline to Venezuela as part of the sanctions on PDVSA.



= Cuban oil shipments
=
Alleging that Cuban personnel and advisors helped the Maduro government maintain power, the U.S. sanctioned two companies on 5 April 2019 that had shipped Venezuelan oil to Cuba, along with 34 ships owned by PDVSA. The U.S. sanctioned nine ships and four more shipping companies on 12 April 2019.
In response to the arrest of National Assembly members, the U.S. sanctioned on 10 May 2019 two shipping companies and two ships that transported oil from Venezuela to Cuba between late 2018 and March 2019. Sanctions on some shipping companies were lifted later in 2019.
The Cuban state-run oil import and export company, Cubametales, was sanctioned on 3 July 2019; a Treasury press release said it had facilitated oil imports to Cuba from Venezuela in exchange for defense support, intelligence, and security assistance. Cuba continued to receive shipments, and four more companies facilitating oil shipments from Venezuela to Cuba were sanctioned in September. In November, the Cuban company Corporacion Panamericana SA was blacklisted for helping Cubametales evade sanctions.



= Petrocaribe
=

Through Petrocaribe, a regional oil procurement agreement between Venezuela and Caribbean member states, Caribbean countries could finance some of their Venezuelan crude oil purchases at 1% interest and Cuba received free oil in exchange for medical services.
Research by the journalism group Connectas said that Petrocaribe countries were intended to protect Venezuela's sovereignty in international organizations like the UN and OAS. Several leaders of Caribbean countries supporting Maduro criticized the US sanctions, saying their support for Maduro was based on principles, not oil, and that sanctions were affecting their countries' supply, debt payments, and the region's stability.
With the Venezuelan crisis dividing Caribbean countries, those countries that did not recognize Maduro were invited to meet with Trump in March 2019; Trump promised more investment to the countries supporting Guaidó (Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica and Saint Lucia).



= 2022–2024: sanctions relief
=

After Joe Biden took office, in 2022 his administration lowered some of the restrictions in the petroleum sector and allowed Chevron Corporation, which had existing investments in Venezuela, to increase production for sales to the U.S. Crude oil exports by July 2023, driven by Chevron and other new agreements allowed under sanctions, rose to their highest level in over three years. Countries like Cuba, China and Iran continued trading with Venezuela, and China become the main source of Venezuela's petroleum revenue in 2023.
In October 2023, the Biden administration eased some sanctions on the oil, gas and gold industries and secondary trading of bonds based on an election agreement signed in Barbados between the Maduro government and opposition parties. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated Maduro would have another month to remove bans on candidates for the 2024 presidential election.
On 17 April 2024, the U.S. announced that some of these sanctions would be reinstated because the Barbados Agreement had not been fully honored and the leading opposition candidate María Corina Machado had not been allowed to run in presidential elections. Waivers to operate in spite of the sanctions were extended to companies with existing oil and gas assets and production in Venezuela; in addition to Chevron, these included Spain's Repsol, Italy's Eni, France's Maurel & Prom, and British Petroleum in Trinidad and Tobago,
After sanctions relief, Spain's 2024 imports through July of Venezuelan petroleum tripled from those of the same period in 2023. With Chevron telling the Biden Administration that it is important that it be allowed to continue operations in Venezuela, where it accounts for 20% of exports, and with Spain becoming a significant importer of Venezuelan petroleum, Venezuela's overall exports increased to the highest level in four years by August. A former PDVSA board member, Pedro Burelli, told The Wall Street Journal that: "Chevron ended up front-running all other interests the U.S. said it had with regard to Venezuela—democracy, the fight for human rights, migration and the fight against corruption".
Following the 2024 Venezuelan presidential election and the resulting political crisis, the U.S. imposed sanctions on 16 individuals on 12 September but did not impose additional sanctions in the petroleum sector; unnamed officials have stated that the Biden Administration was concerned that sanctions could lead to increased immigration or higher oil prices prior to the November 2024 U.S. elections.



Gold

Venezuela's third-largest export (after crude oil and refined petroleum products) in 2019 was gold. The country's gold production is controlled by the military and is mined under dangerous conditions. The World Gold Council reported in January 2019 that Venezuela's foreign-held gold reserves had fallen by 69% to US$8.4 billion during Maduro's presidency, but that it was hard to track where the gold was going. Central Bank gold holdings decreased in November 2018 from US$6.1 billion to US$5.5 billion; the last independent observer to access the vault where gold is stored was Francisco Rodríguez, who saw an estimated US$15 billion in 2014. Reuters reported that 20 tons were removed from the vaults in 2018, and 23 tons of mined gold were taken to Istanbul, Turkey. In the first nine months of 2018, Venezuela's gold exports to Turkey rose from zero in the previous year to US$900 million.
On 1 November 2018 Trump signed an executive order to "ban US persons from dealing with entities and individuals involved with 'corrupt or deceptive' gold sales from Venezuela".
In mid-February 2019, National Assembly legislator Angel Alvarado said that about eight tons of gold had been taken from the vault while the head of the Central Bank was abroad. In March, Ugandan investigators reported that 7.4 tonnes of gold worth over US$300 million could have been smuggled into that country.
The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Minerven, Venezuela's state-run mining company, in March 2019.
Government sources said another eight tonnes of gold was taken out of the Central Bank in the first week of April 2019; the government source said that there were 100 tonnes left. The gold was removed while the bank was not fully operational because of the 2019 Venezuelan blackouts and minimal staff was present; the destination of the gold was not known. According to Bloomberg, the Central Bank sold 9.5 tonnes of gold on 10 May and 3 more tonnes some days later. Reuters estimated in March 2020 that there were about 90 tonnes of gold left in the country, compared to 129 tonnes at the start of 2019.



Banking and finance

Trump signed an order on 19 March 2018 that prohibited people in the US from making any type of transaction with digital currency emitted by or in the name of the government of Venezuela as of 9 January 2018, referencing the Petro token.
On 11 March 2019, the U.S. sanctioned the Russian bank Evrofinance Mosnarbank, stating that the Moscow-based bank was an economic lifeline for Maduro's administration.
After the detention of Guaidó's chief of staff, Roberto Marrero, in March 2019, the US Treasury Department responded by placing sanctions on the Venezuelan bank BANDES and its subsidiaries. China Development Bank had paid billions of dollars through BANDES to the Venezuelan government in exchange for crude oil as of March 2019; the sanctions would make it difficult for Venezuela to restructure its US$20 billion debt with China.
The U.S. Treasury added sanctions to the Central Bank of Venezuela on 17 April 2019. Mnuchin stated that the sanction would "inhibit most Central Bank activities undertaken" by the Maduro administration, but "ensure that regular debit and credit card transactions can proceed and personal remittances and humanitarian assistance continue unabated". The new sanctions closed some loopholes that allowed for continued financing of the government; the Central Bank had been able to obtain loans without seeking approval from the National Assembly, and sold gold to the central banks of other countries. By interrupting the foreign exchange handled by the Central Bank, PDVSA purchases of production supplies were impacted.
The Venezuelan banking sanctions caused a rippled effect in that the New York Federal Reserve decided to restrict opening of new accounts in Puerto Rico's offshore banking industry, and planned tighter restrictions in that area.



CLAP food subsidy program


On 25 July 2019, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned 13 companies involved in a Venezuelan food subsidy program called CLAP, along with 10 people including Maduro's stepsons and Colombian businessman Alex Saab. In 2017, the Venezuelan attorney general, Luisa Ortega Díaz, had named Saab as the owner of a Mexican firm that sold food to the CLAP.
According to Mnuchin, corruption in the "CLAP program has allowed Maduro and his family members to steal from the Venezuelan people" by using "food as a form of social control, to reward political supporters and punish opponents". Saab and another Colombian businessman were charged in the U.S. with money laundering related to a 2011–2015 scheme to pay bribes to take advantage of Venezuela's government-set exchange rate. U.S. Treasury Department officials had stated in April 2018 that Venezuelan officials pocketed 70% of the proceeds allocated for importation programs destined to alleviate hunger in Venezuela.
An April 2019 communication from the U.S. State Department highlighted the 2017 National Assembly investigation finding that the government paid US$42 for food boxes that cost under US$13, and that "Maduro's inner circle kept the difference, which totaled more than $200 million dollars in at least one case", adding that food boxes were "distributed in exchange for votes". On 17 September 2019, the U.S. Treasury Department expanded further sanctions on 16 entities and 3 individuals, accusing them of helping the Venezuelan government profit from food import and distribution.



Airline and aircraft

The U.S. sanctioned 15 PDVSA aircraft on 21 January 2020, stating that they had "been involved in the harassment of U.S. military flights in Caribbean airspace", and had been used to provide transport to sanctioned individuals.
Venezuela's state airline Conviasa (Consorcio Venezolano de Industrias Aeronáuticas y Servicios Aéreos) was blocked under Executive Order 13884 of 5 August 2019 that applied generally to property of the Government of Venezuela, but OFAC explicitly identified it and its fleet of 40 aircraft on the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list on 7 February 2020 to assure compliance.
The Biden Administration began relaxing sanctions on Conviasa in October 2023 under General License 45 for the purpose of deporting Venezuelan nationals from the U.S. General License 45A, issued in November 2023, further eased restrictions on Conviasa, allowing for maintenance of certain Embraer aircraft and was replaced by General License 45B on 29 February 2024, to allow for Venezuelans from non-U.S. jurisdictions to be repatriated.
In November 2023, the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security named three companies that it said had circumvented sanctions by smuggling U.S. aviation parts to Venezuela.
On 2 September 2024, the U.S. seized Maduro's presidential airplane.




Canada



Canada sanctioned 40 Venezuelan officials, including Maduro, in September 2017 for behaviors that undermined democracy after at least 125 people were killed in the 2017 protests and "in response to the government of Venezuela's deepening descent into dictatorship". Canadians were banned from transactions with the individuals, whose Canadian assets were frozen. The Canadian government held that Maduro played a "key role in [Venezuela's] political and economic crisis"; its sanctions targeted his cabinet, military officials, and the Supreme Tribunal of Justice and Electoral Council. Chrystia Freeland, Foreign Minister, said the sanctions were intended to pressure Maduro to "restore constitutional order and respect the democratic rights of the Venezuelan people".
The Canadian regulations of the Special Economic Measures Act prohibited dealings with listed persons subject to some exceptions.




= November 2017

=
On 23 November 2017, Canada added sanctions under the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act, stating the individuals were "responsible for, or complicit in, gross violations of internationally recognized human rights" and had "committed acts of significant corruption, or both". Three of the 19 individuals added to the Canadian list had already been sanctioned in September (Maduro, Tareck El Aissami and Gustavo González López), bringing to 56 the number of individuals sanctioned by Canada as of 2017.




= May 2018

=
Responding to the 2018 presidential elections, Canada sanctioned 14 more Venezuelans. Canada's Special Economic Measures (Venezuela) Regulations were amended on 30 May 2018 to account for the "economic, political and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela" that the Canadian statement said "moves [Venezuela] ever closer to full dictatorship". The government sanctioned Maduro's wife, Cilia Flores, and 13 other members of the ANC and TSJ.




= April 2019

=
In April 2019, Canada announced sanctions on 43 more individuals. The government statement said that high-ranking officials were sanctioned for "anti-democratic actions, particularly relating to the repression and persecution of the members of the interim government, censorship, and excessive use of force against civil society, undermining the independence of the judiciary and other democratic institutions." Foreign Minister Freeland stated that the "Maduro dictatorship" was responsible for the crisis.
The newly sanctioned Venezuelans included Jorge Arreaza, Maduro's Minister of Foreign Affairs.




European Union



In 2017, the E.U. approved an embargo on arms and material, adding Venezuela along with North Korea and Syria, to countries where European companies cannot sell material that may be used for repression. In 2018, those sanctions were continued for another year because of "human rights violations and undermining of democracy and the rule of law under President Nicolás Maduro".
The E.U. sanctioned seven Venezuela officials on 18 January 2018, stating they were responsible for deteriorating democracy in the country: Diosdado Cabello, Néstor Reverol (Interior Minister), Gustavo González López (Head of Intelligence), Antonio Benavides Torres (National Guard Commander), Tibisay Lucena (Head of Electoral Council), Maikel Moreno (Supreme Court President), and Tarek William Saab (Attorney General). The sanctioned individuals were prohibited from entering the nations of the E.U., and their assets were frozen. Cabello, known as number two in Chavismo, had not been sanctioned by the U.S. when the E.U. sanctioned him.
The Venezuelan government appealed the sanctions in the European General Court (EGC) in February 2018; the EGC dismissed the appeal on 20 September 2019.
On 25 June 2018, the E.U. sanctioned another eleven officials in response to the May 2018 Venezuelan presidential election, which it described as "neither free nor fair". The additional sanctions brought the total to 18 Venezuelans sanctioned in European nations. The sanctioned individuals included Tareck El Aissami (Vice President of Economy and Minister for Industry and Production, formerly SEBIN); Freddy Bernal (Head of Local Committees for Supply and Production and SEBIN commissioner); Elías Jaua (Minister of Education and former head of Presidential Commission for the ANC); and Delcy Rodríguez (Vice President).
Voice of America, an American state-backed news broadcaster, reported in April 2019 tension between the U.S. and the E.U. over increasing sanctions; E.U. nations were reluctant to apply sanctions to a nation, despite evidence that Russia's aid was propping up Maduro, but were considering tougher sanctions on individuals in his government. Spain was receiving Venezuelan oil in repayment for debt as of 10 April 2019 and many Spanish companies operated in Venezuela.
In June 2019, the Associated Press reported that the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands were considering imposing sanctions on Maduro and several top officials for the crackdown on political opponents following the 30 April uprising. However, E.U. member states were divided over the timing of any action for fear of derailing a negotiated exit to the country's crisis.
The E.U. sanctioned seven intelligence and security officials in September 2019, taking what Reuters described as a more "severe tone" against torture and bringing to 25 the number of individuals sanctioned by the E.U. Those sanctioned were Alexander Granko, Rafael Antonio Franco Quintero, Carlos Calderón, Nestor Blanco Hurtado, Rafael Blanco Marrero, Alexis Escalona, and Hannover Guerrero.
The E.U. sanctioned eleven individuals on 29 June 2020. Disavowing the December 2020 Venezuelan parliamentary election, on 22 February 2021, the E.U. sanctioned 19 officials of the Maduro administration for what they characterized as violations of fundamental human rights and democratic principles.
In November 2023 the E.U. extended its Venezuelan sanctions through 14 May 2024, following earlier extensions. In its annual review in May 2024, intending to support dialogue ahead of the July 2024 Venezuelan presidential election, the E.U. made an exception and extended its restrictions through 10 January 2025 rather than the full year, recognizing the date the new president-elect would be sworn in. At the same time, the E.U. sought to incentivize free and fair elections, and temporarily lifted sanctions on Elvis Amoroso, head of CNE, the electoral body in Venezuela, and three former officials of that body, Socorro Hernández, Xavier Moreno and Leonardo Morales. Amoroso rejected that easing of restrictions, labeling it immoral, interference in Venezuela's elections and harassment, and demanding that sanctions on everyone in the country be lifted.




Other






= Panama

=

On 27 March 2018, Panama sanctioned 55 public officials and 16 businesses that operate in Panama, related to the family of Maduro's wife, Cilia Flores. Panama thus become the first country in Latin America to sanction the Maduro administration, joining the U.S., Canada, the E.U. and Switzerland. The sanctioned businesses had members of the Malpica-Flores family on their boards of directors.
The sanctions imposed by Panama triggered a diplomatic crisis between the two countries, which ended on 26 April 2018, when Maduro and Panamanian President Juan Carlos Varela agreed to restore diplomatic relations.




= Switzerland

=
Switzerland implemented sanctions against Venezuela on 28 March 2018, freezing the assets of seven ministers and high officials. The sanctions mimicked those of the E.U., expressing concern over individual freedoms, illegitimate elections, and separation of powers.
On 10 July 2018, Switzerland imposed sanctions against the eleven Venezuelans that were sanctioned by the E.U. in June 2018.
The Swiss sanctioned eleven more individuals in on 7 July 2020 for human rights violations.




= Mexico

=
The Mexican Senate froze the assets of officials of the Maduro administration in April 2018 and prohibited them (Antonio Benavides Torres, Delcy Rodríguez, Diosdado Cabello, Maikel Moreno, Néstor Reverol, Tarek William Saab, and Tibisay Lucena) from entering Mexico.
In July 2019, the Mexican Ministry of Finance froze bank accounts of 19 companies related to the sale of low quality and over-priced food to the Venezuelan government's CLAP program and opened an investigation relating to money laundering after detecting "irregularities of more than 150 million dollars".




= Curaçao

=
On 21 June 2019, Curaçao announced a gold import and transit ban on Venezuela. According to prime minister Eugene Rhuggenaath, criminal investigations indicated drug smuggling and money laundering were associated with the Venezuelan gold trade.




= United Kingdom

=
After its exit from the E.U., the United Kingdom continued to issue sanctions aligned with the E.U. In July 2021 the U.K. issued a series of sanctions that included Colombian businessman Alex Saab, and the freezing of assets and travel bans. Álvaro Enrique Pulido, his associate, was also sanctioned—both for "exploiting two of Venezuela's public programs that were established to provide poor Venezuelans with affordable food and housing", stating that the men had inflated prices for personal enrichment, causing "more suffering to Venezuelans who were already in poverty".




Entry bans






= Lima Group

=
After Maduro's second inauguration on 7 January 2019, the Lima Group (except Mexico) announced its member countries would follow Peru's decision to ban the entry of people linked with Maduro's administration.




= Colombia

=
Colombia did not directly sanction Venezuelans, rather banned figures close to Maduro from entering the country. Christian Krüger Sarmiento, director of Colombia Migration, announced in January 2019 that the Colombian government maintained a list of people banned from entering Colombia or subject to expulsion. The initial list had 200 people with a "close relationship and support for the Nicolás Maduro regime", but Krüger said it could change. The list—which was not disclosed in its entirely—was headed by Maduro, his wife Flores, Cabello, and Delcy Rodríguez and encompassed Venezuela's military leadership. The decision to ban collaborators of the Maduro administration from entering Colombia came after the Lima Group disavowed Maduro as the legitimate president of Venezuela.
The head of a company commissioned by the Maduro administration, Monómeros Colombovenezolanos, was not allowed to enter Colombia, nor was Omar Enrique, a Venezuelan singer seeking entry for a performance. Maduro's cousin, Argimiro Maduro Morán, and family were turned back when they sought refuge in Colombia during the 2019 Venezuelan blackouts. In March, Édgar Alejandro Lugo Pereira—an active military person working for Venezuela's Foreign Ministry—was detained and expelled; he was carrying US$14,000 and 20 passports.
Gustavo Petro ordered in September 2022 that Colombia's travel bans be removed.




Evasion


Tareck El Aissami announced in October 2018 in response to U.S. sanctions that all foreign exchange government auctions would be quoted in euros, Chinese yuan and other hard currencies instead of U.S. dollars. He said the government would open bank accounts in Europe and Asia as potential workarounds to financial sanctions and that Venezuela's banking sector would be able to participate in currency auctions three times a week, adding that the government would sell some 2 billion euros amid a rebound in oil prices.
In January 2020, despite the entry ban imposed by the E.U., Maduro Vice President Delcy Rodríguez met in the guest area of the Madrid–Barajas Airport with Spain's minister José Luis Ábalos from the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party.
Following a five-year investigation of 30 Swiss banks for alleged corruption, as of 2021, five had been reprimanded by the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority for laundering money linked to PDVSA, allowing "corrupt members of the Venezuelan government" to evade sanctions and transfer money to Switzerland.
Some ships' captains and owners sympathetic to Venezuela turned off their transponder locations to avoid the U.S. sanctions and deliver oil to Russia, China, and India, creating an environmental risk of ship collisions. As of 2020, Mexico defied the U.S. sanctions by allowing fuel shipments, and in spite of sanctions on both Iran and Venezuela, Iran sent five oil tankers to Venezuela.
Venezuela continued to send money and ship petroleum products to ally countries after sanctions were issued. In April 2022, it sent fuel oil and diesel to Cuba, and paid Saint Vincent and the Grenadines' debt with Petrocaribe, estimated to have been around $189 million dollars. In August 2023, Petróleos de Venezuela increased fuel shipments to Cuba, from 53,000 barrels per day of petroleum products to 65,000 barrels.
Following an investigation by the F.B.I. of trading involving Mexican companies, in January 2021, the U.S. sanctioned a network comprising three people, fourteen companies and six ships for evading sanctions on Venezuelan petroleum products. Six months earlier, three Mexicans, eight Mexican-based companies and two ships were sanctioned.




Impact


The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) said 78 Venezuelans associated with Maduro had been sanctioned by different countries as of March 2018. By September 2019, the Center for Strategic and International Studies said 119 Venezuelans had been sanctioned by several countries.
Maduro and his administration have stated that the U.S. is responsible for the collapse of the Venezuelan economy. Maduro's Foreign Minister Arreaza said in 2019 that economic sanctions had cost the Venezuelan economy US$30 billion; a 2020 WOLA report agreed with that figure. Reporting on Arreaza's statement, the Associated Press said that Maduro was blocking aid on the premise that "Venezuelans are not beggars". After the 2020 U.S. sanctions on Luis Parra, Arreaza stated that the U.S. sanctions were undermining democratic institutions.
Guaidó stated in May 2019 that the sanctions had weakened a network of Cuban spies that he said operated in Venezuela. After the announcement of regional elections in 2021, Guaidó announced a "national salvation agreement" and proposed negotiation with Maduro with a schedule for free and fair elections and international support and observers, in exchange for lifting international sanctions.
Economists and news reports state that the crisis began, and shortages and high inflation existed in Venezuela, before the sanctions and that sanctions prior to 2019 targeted Maduro and Chavismo "elites" while having little impact on average Venezuelans. The Washington Post stated in April 2019 that "the deprivation long predates recently imposed US sanctions". The Wall Street Journal said in January 2019 that economists place the blame for Venezuela's economy shrinking by half on policies of the Maduro administration, "including widespread nationalizations, out-of-control spending that sparked inflation, price controls that led to shortages, and widespread graft and mismanagement".
WOLA said that Venezuela "was already suffering from a years-long crisis" before the 2017 sanctions.
As the humanitarian crisis deepened and expanded, the Trump administration imposed more serious economic sanctions in 2017, and more in 2019. Some economists, scholars and non-governmental organizations state that the sanctions worsened the economic crisis, and limited income sources and public spending, considering that most of Venezuela's food and medicine is imported. In 2021, the US Government Accountability Office concluded that sanctions "likely contributed to Venezuela's economic decline". The report said that as a result of sanctions, Venezuela is selling less oil, at a higher cost and a lower price. In 2023, Al Jazeera wrote that the sanctions had affected citizens. In 2024, the Financial Times described the sanctions as "crippling".
Reuters stated that falling oil prices in 2020 during the COVID-19 recession, alongside the sanctions, contributed to fuel shortages in the country. A Transparencia Venezuela 2020 report stated that an "institutional, political, economic, social and environmental crisis" had "characterized Venezuela for more than a decade", caused by authoritarian administration, while noting that sanctions have impacted the economy. The Council on Foreign Relations called Venezuela "the archetype of a failed petrostate", and said that "oil continues to play the dominant role in the country's fortunes". It said that the fall in oil prices since 2014, due to the 2010s oil glut, "sent Venezuela into an economic and political spiral". Other reports also cited government mismanagement as the cause of or factors in the decline.
In March 2019, Michelle Bachelet, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, stated after a five-person delegation visited Venezuela that the government had not acknowledged or addressed the dramatically deteriorating conditions, and she was concerned that although the serious, long-standing crisis pre-dated the early sanctions, the new sanctions could worsen the situation. Alena Douhan, United Nations special rapporteur, visited Venezuela in early 2021; 66 Venezuelan NGOs asked her to consider the harmful impact of sanctions in the context of years of repression, corruption and economic mismanagement. In her preliminary report, Douhan said that the economic pressure against Venezuela worsened the crisis, but that Venezuela's economic decline "began in 2014 with the fall in oil prices" and that "mismanagement and corruption had also contributed". She asked the U.S., U.K. and Portugal to release an estimated $6 billion in frozen Venezuelan foreign assets. The government welcomed the report, while the opposition accused her of "playing into the hands of the regime". Douhan's report was criticized, and some NGOs manifested on social media with the hashtag "#Lacrisisfueprimero" (The crisis came first).
Christopher Sabatini, the senior research fellow for Latin America at Chatham House, said in a July 2023 Foreign Policy article that as a result of sanctions, Western investors and institutions were either forbidden or discouraged from purchasing Venezuelan debt, and that the share migrated to "shadowy holders" via the United Arab Emirates and Turkey, among others, suspected to be fronts from buyers from China, Iran, Russia and other US rivals. Swiss hedge fund Mangart Capital estimated that the debt held by US interests decreased from 75% in 2017 to between 35% and 40% in 2023. Sabatini argued that as a result the new bondholders could prevent a democratic transition of the country and prevent it from entering global capital exchanges in the future.




= Impact on food, medicine and health

=
A 2019 joint report published by Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health stated that most sanctions were focused on abusive officials involved in corruption, did not target the economy, and that the 2017 sanctions allowed exceptions for food and medicine. Consulting firm ANOVA Policy Research stated in 2021 that the sanctions were linked to a decrease in monthly oil production, and increases in monthly food and medicine imports; it found no evidence of negative effects on food and medicine imports, but wrote that the economic data did not account for price controls on imported products being abandoned in 2017. In 2018, Susana Raffalli had stated that 36% of Venezuelan children had stunted growth prior to sanctions; she cited the PDVAL affair (tons of imported food supplies found rotten during Hugo Chávez's government) as an example of food shortages before sanctions.
The Lancet journal editors noted in 2019 that Maduro had used food as a political weapon and resisted humanitarian aid, and that the U.S. had reacted with sanctions that they said resulted in collateral food and medicine shortages. The editors called for the involvement of non-governmental entities to provide distribution of food and medicine, and for the Venezuelan government to allow them to do so, and stated that the UN Human Rights Council considers economic sanctions a violation of human rights.
An April 2019 report by Mark Weisbrot and Jeffrey Sachs claimed that a 31% rise in deaths between 2017 and 2018 was due to the 2017 sanctions, and that 40,000 people in Venezuela may have died as a result; Weisbrot stated that he "could not prove those excess deaths were the result of sanctions, but said the increase ran parallel to the imposition of the measures and an attendant fall in oil production". The report's findings and methodology were described as invalid and disputed by other economists and accounts, who stated that most of the decline pre-dated the sanctions and that the methodology was flawed, speculative or conjecture. Opposition-aligned academic and Guaido appointee Ricardo Hausmann and Frank Muci published a rebuttal in Americas Quarterly, stating that the analysis took Colombia as a counterfactual for Venezuela, when Colombia and Venezuela are "radically different in other dimensions". They argued that oil production trends between the two nations were different in the decade before sanctions and that a month after the 2017 sanctions, Maduro replaced the PDVSA president with an inexperienced military general who restructured the oil entity, worsening its performance.




= Public perception

=

Polling in 2023 by Datanalisis found that 74% of Venezuelans do not support sanctions, 30% attribute Venezuela's problems to the sanctions, and half of Venezuelans agree with the sanctions on some administration officials. The director of Datanalisis stated that most Venezuelans recognize the government's blame for the sanctions, but have moved away from supporting them because their objectives have not been achieved and have worsened the lives of citizens. A poll by DatinCorp conducted among Venezuelans in 2019 found that 68% believed that the sanctions have affected their quality of life.




Persons sanctioned


Legend: G – Government officials; S – Active or retired military or security officials; O – Other;
N Person no longer sanctioned




Entities sanctioned


Legend: A – Aircraft; C – Company; G – Governmental organization/state institution; S – Ship; N Entity no longer sanctioned




See also


Cartel of the Suns
International sanctions during the Russo-Ukrainian War
International sanctions during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine
International sanctions against Iran
International sanctions during apartheid
United States embargoes




Notes






References






= Bibliography

=
Becker, Marc (2022). Contemporary Latin American Revolutions. Latin American Perspectives in the Classroom (2nd ed.). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. ISBN 9781538163740.




Further reading


"Blaming all ills on sanctions: Chavismo's disinformation strategy to face the economic crisis". Cazadores de Fake News. C-Informa. 19 July 2023.
Demarais, Agathe (2022). Backfire: How Sanctions Reshape the World Against U.S. Interests. Columbia University Press. ISBN 9780231199902.




External links


"Canadian sanctions related to Venezuela". Government of Canada. 19 October 2015.
"Venezuela-related sanctions FAQ". U.S. Department of the Treasury. 10 May 2024.
"Venezuela-related sanctions". U.S. Department of State.
"Sanctions List Search Tool". U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control.

Kata Kunci Pencarian:

• Krisis kepresidenan Venezuela
• Keterlibatan Amerika Serikat dalam pergantian rezim
• Sanctions during the Venezuelan crisis
• U.S. sanctions during the Venezuelan crisis
• International sanctions during the Russo-Ukrainian War
• Crisis in Venezuela
• International sanctions during apartheid
• Venezuelan presidential crisis
• 2024 Venezuelan political crisis
• International sanctions during the Russian invasion of Ukraine
• Barbados Agreement
• Economic sanctions