- Source: Sergey Karaganov
Sergey Alexandrovich Karaganov (Russian: Серге́й Алекса́ндрович Карага́нов, born 12 September 1952) is a Russian political scientist who heads the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, a security analytical institution founded by Vitaly Shlykov. He is also the dean of the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs at Moscow's Higher School of Economics. Karaganov was a close associate of Yevgeny Primakov, and has been Presidential Advisor to both Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. He is considered close to Putin and Sergey Lavrov.
Karaganov has been a member of the Trilateral Commission since 1998, and served on the International Advisory Board of the Council on Foreign Relations. He has also been Deputy Director of the Institute of Europe at the USSR (now Russian) Academy of Sciences since 1983.
Political thought
= Karaganov Doctrine
=Karaganov is known as the progenitor of the Karaganov Doctrine, which states that Moscow should pose as the defender of human rights of ethnic Russians living in the "near abroad" for the purpose of gaining political influence in these regions. In 1992, he formulated the hypothesis that the Russian leadership might feel compelled to use force in order to achieve this goal. This idea was first brought into domestic Russian Federation politics by Boris Yeltsin in 1992, although it was only a fringe ideology in Yeltsin's Russia. It has become a mainstream ideology in Putin's Russia after 2012.
After Karaganov published an article advocating this stance in 1992, Russia's foreign policy position linked Russian troop withdrawals from the Baltics with the end of "systemic discrimination" against Russians in these countries. It was already a subject of controversy in February 1994 when the doctrine was the subject of remarks by Lennart Meri, the then-president of Estonia, in his Matthiae-Mahl speech in Hamburg on 25 February.
In 2022 Karaganov claimed full ownership of this idea in a serious interview.
The Karaganov Doctrine has been likened by scholars to the idea that furnished Hitler's 1938 Anschluss of Austria.
= Eurasianism as ideology
=In addition to his Doctrine, Karaganov has advocated for a united Sino-Russian strategy to unify a Eurasian bloc. He argues that the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and China's One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR), will work together to promote economic integration throughout the region. Many experts disagree with this judgement, claiming that China, as a far more powerful economy, will simply dominate this Eurasian bloc. This would counter Russian ambitions to regain their foothold as a global power.
= Authoritarianism embedded into genetic code
=Karaganov has been quoted to say: "Russia is genetically an authoritarian power. Russia’s authoritarianism was not imposed from above but is the result of our history which has formed our genetic code."
= On Russian might
=In an April 2002 interview published in the journal Russia in Foreign Affairs, Karaganov defined Russia's main foreign policy goal as forcing its own dominance on the globe and breaking the security order put in place at the end of the Cold War in 1991.
He said shortly before the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine began:
The process of restoring Russian statehood, Russian influence, Russian power, which had been going on for quite a long time, had simply come to the surface … Now as our strength, especially military strength, has accumulated and the geopolitical situation has changed, we felt the right to demand things, not to ask for them.
= Russia's dependence on China
=In April 2022, Karaganov said that Russia "will be more integrated and more dependent on China", further stating that "Chinese are our close allies and friends and the biggest source of Russian strength after Russian people themselves."
Role in Russia's war on Ukraine
In 2014, Karaganov warned that Russia may attack Ukraine, that "hell" would break out in Ukraine if Russia's demand that Ukraine remain a neutral state outside of NATO is ignored, and if the Russian-speaking regions in the east and south of Ukraine are not granted broad autonomy along the lines of the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Dayton Agreement.
In an April 2019 interview with Time Magazine, Karaganov considered that not allowing Russia to join NATO was "one of the worst mistakes in political history. It automatically put Russia and the West on a collision course, eventually sacrificing Ukraine". In January 2022, he stated that NATO is a "political cancer" that aims to kill the "healthy" Russian state.
In January 2022, he denied accusations that Russia was planning to invade Ukraine and claimed that Russian troops were concentrated at the Russia–Ukraine border to prevent a possible Ukrainian attack on Donbas.
Karaganov, who is known as a close advisor to Russian President Vladimir Putin, formulated many of the core ideas that led to Russia's invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. One week earlier Karaganov explained that "the situation is so dire" that "war is inevitable", as Russia could only achieve its goals by military means, since, unlike the United States, the dominant post-Cold War power, Russia had no political, cultural, ideological or economic benefits by which to bring other states under its influence. Karaganov lamented that Russia's neighbors generally saw the West as offering more attractive political and economic models, and Russia therefore had no choice but to gain their submission by force.
Regarding Ukraine, Karaganov claimed that it was necessary to subdue it in order to prevent the further expansion of NATO. As justification for an aggression, Karaganov suggested that Ukraine was not a viable state anyway, and "most likely, the country will slowly disintegrate," or, alternatively, it will be broken up into smaller parts, and "something may go to Russia, something to Hungary, something to Poland, and something may remain a formally independent Ukrainian state." However, he has said that "occupying" Ukraine is "the worst-case scenario".
Instead of the legally-mandated "police action" or "special military operation", Karaganov uses the word "war" openly: "The stakes of the Russian elite are very high – for them it is an existential war." He has also said that "we need a kind of a solution which would be called peace, and which would include de facto the creation of some kind of a viable, pro-Russian government on the territory of Ukraine, and real security for the Donbas republics."
In April 2022, in an interview with the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera, Karaganov stated that "war was inevitable, they were a spearhead of NATO. We made the very hard decision to strike first, before the threat becomes deadlier." He further said the war in Ukraine "will be used to restructure Russian elite and Russian society. It will become a more militant-based and national-based society, pushing out non-patriotic elements from the elite." He also said that "Demilitarization means destruction of Ukrainian military forces - that is happening and will accelerate. Of course, if Ukraine is supported with new weapons, that could prolong the agony. ... The war will be victorious, in one way or another. I assume demilitarization will be achieved and there will be denazification, too. Like we did in Germany and in Chechnya. Ukrainians will become much more peaceful and friendly to us."
In May 2022 Karaganov stated India figured extremely high on the agenda of the Russian foreign policy and strong India-Russia ties will help stabilise New Delhi’s ties with Beijing, besides bringing a balance in Moscow’s partnership with China.
In June 2023, Karaganov called for the use of nuclear weapons by Russia against NATO member states in Europe, saying that "we will have to hit a bunch of targets in a number of countries in order to bring those who have lost their mind to reason." He concluded that "By breaking the West’s will to continue the aggression, we will not only save ourselves and finally free the world from the five-century-long Western yoke, but we will also save humanity." According to Karaganov, "countries in the Global South would feel satisfaction from the defeat of their former oppressors" and Russia together with China "will win for the benefit of everyone, including the people living in Western countries." In response to Karaganov's suggestions, American historian Alexander J. Motyl wrote: "Some Western policymakers and analysts believe that Russia isn’t irrational, that its rationality is unlike that found in the West. Whatever the case, just how does one talk to people who completely misunderstand geopolitical realities, truly believe that nuclear weapons are a product of divine intervention, aspire to create a messianic Russia, and believe that destroying Poznan and other European cities isn’t to start World War III but to prevent it?." As of June 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected such proposals, saying "I reject this. … First, we see no need to use it [a tactical nuclear strike]; and second, considering this, even as a possibility, factors into lowering the threshold for the use of such weapons." Also in 2023, Karaganov coauthored a critical analysis of Russian foreign policy in recent years. In this paper, he and other coauthors recommended the annexion of Ukraine's southeastern regions. Meanwhile, according to them, the energy, industrial, and transport infrastructure of western Ukraine should be destroyed, and this region turned into a buffer on the border with the West. They also believed that one or two million Ukrainians should be deported to Siberia, and that Ukrainian prisoners of war should be used to build transport routes between Russia's Arctic coastline with Asian countries to the South.
Karaganov was a host for the June 2024 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum where he shared the stage with Vladimir Putin and other global leaders like Emmerson Mnangagwa.
Personal life
Karaganov is the only intellectual from the former Soviet Union listed in the 2005 Global Intellectuals Poll,
Karaganov owns an apartment in Venice. Karaganov has been barred from entering the EU after his calls to use nuclear weapons.
See also
Ruscism
Eurasianism
Revanchism
Russian imperialism
Russian nationalism
Russian irredentism
Russia–Ukraine relations
References
= Select bibliography
="Russia Needs to Defend Its Interests with an Iron Fist". Financial Times. 5 March 2014.
"Eurasian Way Out of the European Crisis". Russia in Global Affairs. 8 June 2015.
"The Promise of Eurasia". karaganov.ru (in Russian). Russian newspaper, Federal issue 6812 (241). 26 October 2015.
"Eurasia will be the Center of World Geopolitics Soon". Sputnik. 28 February 2018.
Karaganov, Sergey (July 2018). "The new Cold War and the emerging Greater Eurasia". Journal of Eurasian Studies. 9 (2): 85–93. doi:10.1016/j.euras.2018.07.002. S2CID 158984867.
"A New World Order - A View from Russia". No. with Dmitry Suslov. Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development. Winter 2019.
"The Military Underpinning of the Geopolitical Revolution". International Laboratory on World Order Studies and the New Regionalism and Department of International Relations. The 14th Session of Eurasian Online Seminar with Sergey Karaganov. 4 June 2020.
= Interviews
="Karaganov: Russia shall not attack Ukraine. Its future lies with Eurasia and with China". Domus Europa. Frontiere Revisti di Geocultura. 26 January 2022.
Maçães, Bruno (2 April 2022). ""Russia cannot afford to lose, so we need a kind of a victory": Sergey Karaganov on what Putin wants". New Statesman.
Limes (Italian online journal) (3 June 2022). "Interview with Sergei Karaganov: 'If We Lost, Russia Would Risk Breaking Apart'". Russia Matters. Carnegie Corporation of New York.
Schmemann, Serge (19 July 2022). "Why Russia Believes It Cannot Lose the War in Ukraine". New York Times.
= Criticism
=Hiden, John; Made, Vahur; Smith, David J. (2008). The Baltic question during the Cold War. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-37100-1.
Berryman, J. (2010). "Russia and China in Eurasia: The Wary Partnership". In Freire, M.R.; Kanet, R.E. (eds.). Key Players and Regional Dynamics in Eurasia. London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 126–145. doi:10.1057/9780230290754_7. ISBN 978-1-349-32425-5.
Baev, Pavel K. (11 April 2011). "Stalin's Shadow Hangs over Medvedev's Modernization". Eurasia Daily Monitor.
Maliukevičius, Nerijus (2013). "(Re)Constructing Russian Soft Power in Post-Soviet Region" (PDF). Baltic Security & Defence Review. 15 (2): 70.
Starr, S. Frederick. "Greater Eurasia: Russia's Asian Fantasy". Wilson Center.
Köstem, Seçkin. "Russia's Search for a Greater Eurasia: Origins, Promises, and Prospects". Wilson Center.
de Wijk, Rob (2016). Power Politics - How China and Russia Reshape The World. Amsterdam University Press.
Entin, Mark; Entina, Ekaterina (2016). "Russia's role in promoting Great Eurasia geopolitical project". Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali. 83 (3 (331)): 331–351. JSTOR 44427783 – via JSTOR.
Sherlock, Thomas (March 2016). "Russian politics and the Soviet past: Reassessing Stalin and Stalinism under Vladimir Putin". Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 49 (1): 45–59. doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2016.01.001.
Vinokurov E (2017) Eurasian Economic Union: Current state and preliminary results. Russian Journal of Economics 3(1): 54-70. Eurasian Economic Union: Current state and preliminary results
Charap, Samuel; Shapiro, Jeremy; Demus, Alyssa (2018). "Rethinking the Regional Order for Post-Soviet Europe and Eurasia" (PDF).
Blackburn, Matthew (January 2018). National identity, nationalist discourse and the imagined nation in post-Soviet Russia (PhD) (PDF). University of Glasgow.
Lewis, David G. (14 Nov 2018). "Geopolitical Imaginaries in Russian Foreign Policy: The Evolution of "Greater Eurasia"". Europe-Asia Studies. 70 (10): 1612–1637. doi:10.1080/09668136.2018.1515348. hdl:10871/31787. S2CID 158821862.
Sukhankin, Sergey (14 December 2018). "From 'Turn to the East' to 'Greater Eurasia': Russia's Abortive Search for a Far East Strategy". Jamestown. Vol. 15, no. 177. Eurasia Daily Monitor. The Jamestown Foundation.
Rolland, Nadège (January 2019). "A China–Russia Condominium over Eurasia".
Macaes, Bruno (March 2019). The Dawn of Eurasia: On the Trail of the New World Order. Penguin UK.
Diesen, Glenn (July 2019). Russia's Geoeconomic Strategy for a Greater Eurasia.
Lo, Bobo (July 2019). "Greater eurasia - The Emperor's New Clothes or an Idea whose Time Has Come?" (PDF). IFRI. Russie.Nei.Reports.
Lewis, David (July 2019). "Strategic Culture and Russia's "Pivot to the East:" Russia, China, and "Greater Eurasia"".
VISHNEVSKAYA-MANN, ANASTASIA (2019). "Central Asia in Russia's Greater Eurasia".
Gretskiy, Igor (Fall 2019). "Lukyanov Doctrine: Conceptual Origins of Russia's Hybrid Foreign Policy—The Case of Ukraine". Saint Louis University Law Journal. 64 (1).
Arbatova, Nadezhda (November 2019). "Three Faces of Russia's Neo-Eurasianism". International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Soroka, George; Stępniewski, Tomasz (2020). "Russia and the Rest: Permeable Sovereignty and the Former Soviet Socialist Republics" (PDF). Journal of Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society. 6 (2): 3–12.
Berls, Robert E. Jr. (13 July 2021). "Survival of the Russian State: Protecting It from Foreign and Domestic Threats, Part I". Nuclear Threat Initiative.
Diesen, Glenn; Lukin, Alexander (July 2021). The Return of Eurasia: Continuity and Change. Springer Nature. ISBN 9789811621796.
Kuzio, Taras (2022-01-26). Russian Nationalism and the Russian-Ukrainian War (PDF). Routledge. ISBN 978-1-000-53408-5.
Macaes, Bruno (27 January 2022). "What Happens Next in Ukraine Could Change Europe Forever". Time.
Nagy-Mohacsi, Piroska; Blejer, Mario I. (12 July 2022). The Yeltsin Era: Only a Historic Blip in the Continuum of the Russian Empire? (PDF) (Report).
Sinovets, Paulina (September 2022). "The Nuclear Weapons Factor on Interstate Politics in the Russia-Ukraine War".
Tsygankov, Andrei (Nov 2022). "Russia, Eurasia and the Meaning of Crimea". Europe-Asia Studies. 74 (9): 1551–1573. doi:10.1080/09668136.2022.2134307. S2CID 253655942.
External links
Official website