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    During the 2020s, there was a significant shift in European Union defense policy, particularly accelerating in 2025 due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and geopolitical policy shifts during the second presidency of United States President Donald Trump. This transformation was characterized by increased defense spending, reindustralization of defense manufacturing, and initiatives for greater military integration among EU member states, with the intent of developing autonomous European defense capabilities independent of NATO and the United States.


    History



    Prior to the 2020s, the European Union maintained its Common Security and Defence Policy that focused primarily on crisis management and peacekeeping operations. The EU successfully deployed approximately 40 international missions under this framework. However, the bloc remained heavily dependent on NATO and United States military support for territorial defense, despite provisions in the EU Treaty allowing for the creation of common defense mechanisms and mutual assistance agreements between member states.


    Military inefficacy


    By early 2024, there were significant disparities among NATO member states. Of the alliance's 32 members, only 18 had achieved or committed to reaching the agreed-upon target of spending 2% of GDP on defense. This represented a marked decrease from historical Cold War spending levels, when European NATO members typically allocated between 3% and 5% of their national GDP to defense expenditures. Areas described as lacking included integrated anti-aircraft defense systems and deep precision strike capabilities deemed inadequate for contemporary threats, as well as significant vulnerabilities in command and control infrastructure and logistical systems. These deficiencies emerged despite the adoption of new regional defense plans at the 2023 Vilnius NATO summit.
    Despite promised commitments to increased military spending by European leaders, many European nations failed to convert their pledges into concrete manufacturing contracts. This hampered the expansion of defense manufacturing capabilities necessary for both supporting Ukraine against Russia's invasion and replenishing NATO's own military stocks. Nation's along NATO's eastern flank demonstrated greater urgency in military modernization efforts, while European nations further west generally showed less immediacy in their approach to defense spending and capability development.
    Analysis from the European Defence Agency identified that lack of cooperation between member states resulted in annual inefficiencies of approximately €25 billion. Despite EU members collectively spending roughly one-third of U.S. defense expenditures, their combined capabilities amounted to only about 10% of American military capacity. Member nations also faced challenges regarding the allocation of resources between defense spending and social welfare programs, especially among nations such as Germany with ongoing economic crises.


    Geopolitical shifts


    The United States began shifting its strategic focus from Europe to the Indo-Pacific region during the Obama administration, with both Democratic and Republican establishments increasingly viewing China, rather than Russia, as their primary strategic competitor. This shift continued through subsequent administrations, reducing American military emphasis on European defense.
    The return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency in 2025 introduced significant uncertainty into transatlantic security relationships. Trump's skepticism toward NATO and suggestions that the U.S. might not defend allies who failed to meet certain financial obligations created new urgency for European military self-sufficiency. Additional concerns arose regarding potential U.S. positions on conflicts affecting European security, particularly regarding Russia and Ukraine amid the former's invasion of Ukrainian territory. These included Trump's call and meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin discussing peace negotiations without input from Ukraine or European parties, statements made by United States Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth critical of the lack of equal military contributions from European nations, and a speech made by United States Vice President JD Vance at the 61st Munich Security Conference critical of European governance for annulling elections in favor of less anti-Russian candidates.


    Re-armament efforts


    In March 2024, the European Union's von Der Leyen Commission released the European Defense Industrial Strategy, which suggested a switch to "war economy mode" due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and fears over Donald Trump's rumored withdrawal from NATO. European Commissioner for Internal Market Thierry Breton said: "Europe must take greater responsibility for its own security, regardless of the outcome of our allies' elections every four years." The strategy established several ambitious targets for 2030, including requirements for EU member states to allocate 50% of their procurement budgets to purchases from Europe's industrial defense sector.
    The plan also aimed to increase collaborative equipment procurement from 18% to 40% and raise intra-European Union defense trade to 35% of the overall EU defense market value. The strategy also introduced the European Defense Industry Programme (EDIP) with an initial allocation of €1.5 billion for 2025–2027. This program aimed to incentivize joint weapons production and enhance collaboration between defense manufacturers across member states. The document also advocated for the incorporation of Ukraine into European defense, including Ukrainian industry participation in EU defense programs, establishment of an EU-Ukraine Defense Industry Forum, and the creation of an EU Defense Innovation Office in Kyiv to exchange combat experience and technological insights.
    The €1.5 billion allocated fell significantly short of the €100 billion fund suggested by European Commissioner for Internal Market Thierry Breton. Various funding mechanisms were proposed, including the potential use of frozen Russian state assets and adjustments to European Investment Bank lending policies to include defense projects.
    In February 2025, NATO initiated discussions to substantially increase its defense spending targets for member nations above the previous 2% GDP benchmark established a decade earlier. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte announced during the 61st Munich Security Conference that alliance members would need to increase their military spending to "considerably more than 3 percent" of national GDP. This statement came in response to U.S. calls for members to reach 5% of GDP in defense expenditure.
    On February 14, 2025, President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen advocated for activating an emergency clause to facilitate increased defense spending by European Union member states. The clause would forego typical strict budget deficit limits for member states, and would enable increased defense spending without requiring corresponding budget cuts in other areas.
    Eastern European nations, particularly the Baltic states and Poland, demonstrated willingness to approach higher spending levels to address potential threats from Russia. France, along with Southern European nations with high debt levels including Italy and Greece, also supported the initiative. However, Northern European countries with fiscally conservative governments such as the Netherlands, Germany, and Sweden expressed opposition to new debt issuance during treasury discussions. Other nations, including the United Kingdom, advocated for more moderate targets between 2.5% and 3.5% of GDP.


    National changes




    Denmark


    On February 19, 2025, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen announced a significant increase in defense spending to 3% of national GDP, an increase from 2.4% in 2024. This increase, implemented through a 50 billion Danish kroner "acceleration fund" represented the highest level of Danish defense spending in over fifty years. The Danish government emphasized rapid procurement of military equipment, with Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen warning that Russia could threaten NATO countries within two years without appropriate counter-measures.


    Estonia


    On February 19, 2025, Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur announced plans to allocate more than 4% of Estonia's GDP to defense spending by 2026.


    France


    In February 2025, French President Emmanuel Macron characterized Russia as an "existential threat" to Europe, convening a special meeting in Paris to coordinate European responses under the Weimar+ framework. Macron also stated his willingness to send ground troops to Ukraine for combat against Russia if necessary.


    Germany


    Following German reunification in 1990, the country's defense industry experienced substantial downsizing, with employment in the sector declining by approximately 60% from 290,000 to 100,000 jobs. Political attitudes during this period from leaders such as Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel in 2014 often expressed reluctance to engage with the defense industry.
    A €100 billion special defense fund established in 2022 provided initial resources for military procurement. However, projections in 2024 indicated this funding would be depleted by 2027, creating an estimated annual funding gap of €50 billion for continued defense modernization efforts. Much of Germany's military equipment procurement at the time remained dependent on foreign manufacturing, such as the procurement of military vehicles being dependent on Rheinmetall's Australian facilities. By early 2024, opposition parties, particularly the CDU/CSU, criticized the government's pace of industrial expansion, comparing it unfavorably to Russia's rapid military-industrial mobilization. Within the governing traffic light coalition, the Green Party expressed concerns about ensuring eventual scalability reduction when security conditions improved.
    In March 2024, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz emphasized the need for sustained arms manufacturing capacity rather than depending on military procurement through purchasing transactions. In Troisdorf, North Rhine-Westphalia, citizens and local politicians protested against Diehl Defence's planned ammunition factory, citing concerns about required security zones and land use conflicts. Similar resistance emerged in Saxony regarding potential Rheinmetall facilities.
    In April 2024, Vice Chancellor and Green Party member Robert Habeck declared that he viewed his role as a "defense industry minister", despite his party's traditionally pacifist stance.
    Rheinmetall experienced unprecedented growth as a military producer in 2024. Rheinmetall initiated a €1.3 billion investment program to expand ammunition production capabilities across multiple countries, including Australia, Romania, Hungary, and Ukraine, while planning to establish an armored vehicle manufacturing facility in Ukraine. Rheinmetall CEO Armin Papperger called U.S. President Donald Trump's demands for greater military spending across EU nations a "wake-up call".
    In February 2025, a spokesperson for Germany's defense ministry stated that it would send ground troops to Ukraine if necessary.


    Latvia


    In 2014, only 0.94% of Latvia's GDP was allocated to defense spending.
    On February 19, 2025, Latvian Defense Minister Andris Sprūds and Latvian Prime Minister Evika Siliņa stated that Latvia would assign at least 4% of the country's GDP to defense in 2026, with the intention of raising it to 5% over time.


    Lithuania


    Between 2010 and 2014, Lithuanian military spending declined to less than 1% of national GDP, and the country abolished conscription from 2008 to 2015, leading to increased dependence on NATO. The Russian invasion of Ukraine's close proximity to the Baltic States led to the country increasing its defense spending to 2.8% of national GDP in 2024, while simultaneously developing new domestic production and maintenance capabilities to reduce supply chain vulnerabilities.
    In June 2024, Lithuania signed a landmark $200 million investment agreement with German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall to establish an ammunition production facility. The plant, designated as a project of "state importance," received expedited administrative procedures and was designed to produce NATO-standard 155mm artillery shells. Production was scheduled to commence by late 2025.


    The Netherlands


    Dutch Finance Minister Eelco Heinen advocated for compensating increased defense spending through budget cuts in other areas besides through additional common debt issuance.


    Poland


    In May 2024, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski advocated for substantial increases in European defense spending, setting an example by allocating 4% of the nation's GDP to defense. Sikorski also supported several initiatives for enhanced European military cooperation, including the establishment of a 5,000-strong EU mechanized brigade, as well as incorporation of the United Kingdom and Ukraine into existing European defense structures. Sikorski spoke against the earlier "deindustrialization" of European defense capabilities.
    In February 2025, Poland was Europe's leading defense spender, allocating 4.7% of its GDP to military expenditure and significantly exceeding NATO's target threshold. Prime Minister of Poland Donald Tusk emphasized maintaining strong U.S.-European relations while advocating for increased European defense capabilities, in contrast with statements from other European leaders urging for greater defense autonomy away from the United States. Tusk also diverted from French President Emmanuel Macron's desire to send national troops into Ukraine for combat, instead recommending logistical support. Sikorski recommended the creation of an "investment bank" so the European Union could push back against Russia aggression.


    Spain


    In February 2025, Spanish Finance Minister Carlos Cuerpo proposed expanding the EU's common debt mechanisms to finance defense spending. He suggested that increased defense expenditure be treated as a "public good" and logical extension of the €650 billion Next Generation EU post-Covid recovery program. At the time, Spain maintained the lowest defense spending ratio among NATO countries at 1.28% of GDP, though it committed to reaching the NATO target of 2% by 2029.


    Challenges


    The rearmament effort faced several significant challenges. Due to Europe's prior deindustrialization especially in military sectors, defense contractors struggled with capacity constraints amid increased demand for arming Ukraine. This limited their ability to produce sufficient quantities of military equipment such as tanks, artillery shells, and fighter jets. European Defense ministers and industry leaders consistently highlighted the challenge of absorption capacity— the ability of defense industries to effectively utilize increased funding.
    Many European nations grappled with budgetary limitations and competing priorities regarding social programs. For instance, France's defense budget of ~€50.5 billion (just above 2% of national GDP) would require an additional €30 billion every year to reach 3% of GDP that would be difficult to allocate amid existing budget deficits and EU fiscal rules.
    The rearmament trend prompted significant debate about the balance between defense spending and social welfare programs. While some leaders, including NATO Secretary-General Rutte, advocated for redirecting a portion of social spending toward defense, this proposition met resistance from many European governments. Credit rating agency Moody's estimated that increasing defense spending to 4% of GDP would require up to a 6% reallocation of public spending in Europe's six largest economies.


    Reactions


    During a trip to Warsaw during February 2025, United States Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth praised the United States' alliance with Poland, stating that the nation was "leading by example" in terms of defense spending relative to other NATO members.
    Several reporters noted that European Defense Industrial Strategy proposals needed to be approved by the European Parliament and by all twenty-seven member states of the European Union, including Ireland which as noted by Euronews remains neutral. Royal Military School teacher and Université catholique de Louvain researcher Alain De Neve said it was clear that von der Leyen had not embarked on a war economy. Vice-President of the European Commission Margrethe Vestager acknowledged that the programme was "not a lot of money when it comes to the defence industry".
    Geopolitical author and journalist George Monbiot believed that potential changes to U.S. foreign policy away from Europe and NATO should prompt the United Kingdom nations to reconsider their defense postures towards independent militarization and nuclear armament. Swedish security expert Elisabeth Braw advocated for an increase in explosive experts to train military compatriots.


    See also


    German rearmament
    West German rearmament
    British re-armament


    References

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2020s european re armament

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The European Union Charts Its Own Path for European Rearmament …

Mar 8, 2024 · The European Union has rolled out its first-ever Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS), aiming at boosting the “competitiveness” and “readiness” of the European defense industrial and technological base (EDTIB).

How Europe can pay for rearmament | The Strategist

1 day ago · There is a precedent for this: the European Union’s €750 billion (US$782 billion) Covid-19 recovery fund. Another round of joint borrowing to the tune of €500 billion (3 percent of EU GDP) could amplify member states’ defence spending, help to rationalise European defence procurement, and potentially bolster European defence firms.

Portal:Current events/2025 February 19 - Wikipedia

2020s European re-armament. Denmark announces 50 billion kroner for defence spending over the next two years, citing an increased threat from Russia, bringing the country's total defence spending to the highest in more than half a century. Former President of Brazil Jair Bolsonaro is formally charged with leading the 2022 Brazilian coup plot.

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May 12, 2024 · With NATO’s 75th anniversary summit drawing near, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz told the Munich Security Conference in February that Germany would this year meet NATO’s 2% of GDP target for defense spending and …

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Jul 7, 2022 · The European Commission has declared that “investments will be needed to replenish the depleted stocks of military equipment,” and Josep Borrell, the EU’s top foreign policy official, has called for the bloc “to spend together, more, and better” on its armed forces.

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Nov 19, 2024 · Into the 2020s, several new EU strategies and documents promised economic policies geared toward the defense of “Europe’s sovereignty”—implying a more political tenor to economic strategy. 5 In early 2021, the European Commission placed open strategic autonomy at the core of its Trade Policy Review, defining the concept as “the EU’s ...